A Study on Damage to Property, Intimidation, Threats, Harm, and Killing of Councillors and Municipal Officials

2019
VIOLENCE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT
A Study on Damage to Property, Intimidation, Threats, Harm, and Killing of Councillors and Municipal Officials

2019
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

SALGA Editorial Team
Lance Joel: Acting Executive Director, Governance & IGR
Collen Rammule: Project leader
Sonwabo Gqegqe: Project leader
Mulanga Bodika: Project Manager
Mbali Mahlobo: Manager IGR
Nomusa Ngwenya: Director Municipal Barometer
Justin Steyn: Policy Analyst Municipal Barometer
Ntsakisi Madzibane: Senior Advisor Knowledge Management
Mthokozisi Zwane: Graphic Designer

Contributors
SALGA Governance Provincial Managers
Armstrong Mpela, Gaethijwe Letlhaku; Khwezi Cain; Knox Mlati; Laurentina Diale; Lerato Malibe; Loyiso Njamela; Michael Chauke; Millicent Monyamane; Nkosiyabo Singanto; Noluthando Radebe; Pitsi Makanete; Sello Marokane; Simnikiwe Stemela; Thandi Radebe; Tshepo Masethe; and Zanele Madadasana

Stakeholders
South African Special Risk Insurance Agency: Data on Damage to Municipal Assets and Properties
Human Science Research Council: Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery unit & SALGA Principal Research Partner
### CONTENTS

**ACRONYMS** .................................................................................................................. 5  
**TABLES** ...................................................................................................................... 6  
**FIGURES** .................................................................................................................... 7  
**MAPS** ........................................................................................................................ 7  
**FOREWORD BY SALGA PRESIDENT** ........................................................................ 8  
**OVERVIEW: SALGA CEO** ....................................................................................... 9  
**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY** .......................................................................................... 10  

1. **INTRODUCTION** ..................................................................................................... 20  
2. **CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK** ................................................................................ 23  
   2.1 Background ............................................................................................................ 24  
   2.2 Political Violence and Political Killings ................................................................. 24  
   2.3 Relative Deprivation Theory and Resource Mobilisation Theory ....................... 26  
   2.4 Political Violence in the South African Context .................................................. 27  
   2.5 Key Reasons behind Political Killings .................................................................. 28  
   2.6 Lack of Credible and Documented Information on Political Killings .................. 29  
3. **APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY** ..................................................................... 31  
   3.1 Document, database and media analysis ................................................................ 32  
   3.2 The Survey Questionnaire ..................................................................................... 33  
   3.3 In-depth Interviews and Focus Groups .................................................................. 33  
4. **HISTORICAL DATABASE** ....................................................................................... 35  
   4.1 Analysis of Political Violence for 2000-2018 ......................................................... 36  
   4.2 Discussion and Findings ......................................................................................... 41  
5. **THE SOUTH AFRICAN SPECIAL RISK INSURANCE AGENCY DATABASE** .... 43  
   5.1 Analysis of SASRIA Database for the Period 2013-2018 ....................................... 43  
   5.2 Discussion and Findings ......................................................................................... 48  
6. **SURVEY OF EXPERIENCES OF HARM OR THREATS OF VIOLENCE AMONG LOCAL  
   GOVERNMENT COUNCILLORS, WARD COMMITTEE MEMBERS, MUNICIPAL MANAGERS AND  
   SENIOR OFFICIALS** ................................................................................................. 49  
   6.1 Characteristics of Respondents ........................................................................... 50  
   6.2 Experience of Threat or Harm ............................................................................. 51  
   6.3 Types of Threat or Violence ................................................................................. 53  
   6.4 Remedial Actions .................................................................................................. 57  
   6.5 Effects of Violence ............................................................................................... 58  
   6.6 Protest Action ....................................................................................................... 61  
   6.7 Summary and Conclusion of Survey Findings ..................................................... 63
7. RICHMOND, UMGUNGUNDLOVU DISTRICT, KWAZULU-NATAL CASE STUDY ........................................... 65
   7.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 66
   7.2 Reasons for Political Killings ........................................................................................................................ 68
   7.3 Unpacking acts of Violence/Threats/Intimidation ....................................................................................... 69
   7.4. Impact of Political Violence on Victims ..................................................................................................... 71
   7.5 Impact of Political Violence on the Municipality ....................................................................................... 72
   7.6 Discussion and Findings ............................................................................................................................... 72

8. CITY OF CAPE TOWN (ATLANTIS) CASE STUDY ......................................................................................... 75
   8.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 76
   8.2 The Dangers Inherent to Local Government Politics .................................................................................. 77
   8.3 Factors that Complicate Local Politics ........................................................................................................ 78
   8.4 Direct and Threats of Attack ......................................................................................................................... 80
   8.5 Motivations/Reasons for Violence and Threats ........................................................................................... 81
   8.6 Psychological and Emotional Effects of the Violence .................................................................................. 82
   8.7 Response by City: Contesting Care, Protection and Security ....................................................................... 83
   8.8 Discussion and Findings ............................................................................................................................... 85

9. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................................. 87

10. RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................................................................. 91

REFERENCES ...................................................................................................................................................... 95

ANNEXURE 1 IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW DISCUSSION SCHEDULE: Politicians ...................................................... 97
ANNEXURE 2 IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW DISCUSSION SCHEDULE: Senior Municipal Officials ......................... 98
ANNEXURE 3 MULTI-STAKEHOLDER FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION SCHEDULE ........................................ 99
ANNEXURE 4 THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE .............................................................................................. 100
ANNEXURE 5 POLITICIANS/Political REPRESENTATIVES (INFORMATION SHEET AND CONSENT FORM) .... 103
ANNEXURE 6 SENIOR Municipal Officials (INFORMATION SHEET AND CONSENT FORM) ..................... 106
ANNEXURE 7 MULTI-STAKEHOLDER FOCUS GROUPS (INFORMATION SHEET) ........................................ 109
ACRONYMS

ANC  African National Congress
COGTA  Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs
CSVVR  Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation
DA  Democratic Alliance
EFF  Economic Freedom Fighters
IEP  Institute for Economics and Peace
IDP  Integrated Development Plan
IFP  Inkatha Freedom Party
IRIS  Incident Registration Information System
HSRC  Human Sciences Research Council
NDP  National Development Plan
NFP  National Freedom Party
SALGA  South African Local Government Association
SAPS  South African Police Services
SASRIA  South African Special Risk Insurance Agency
SEZ  Special Economic Zone
SPSS  Statistical Package of the Social Sciences
UDM  United Democratic Movement
UBPL  Upper-bound Poverty Line
WHO  World Health Organization
# TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1</td>
<td>Political Violence for 2000-2018</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2</td>
<td>Rand Value of Damage per Peril</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3</td>
<td>Top Twenty Highest ‘Total Claim’ Municipalities</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4</td>
<td>Distribution of Respondents by Province, Gender and Respondent Category</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5</td>
<td>Distribution of Respondents by Province, Municipality Type, Age and Years of Service</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6</td>
<td>Exposure to Violence or Threat by Occupation and Municipality Type</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7</td>
<td>Exposure to Violence or Threat by Respondent Province and Gender</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 8</td>
<td>Exposure to Violence or Threat by Respondent Age Group and Duration of Service</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 9</td>
<td>How Often or Frequently have you Experienced a Threat or Violence?</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 10</td>
<td>Sources of Threats Experienced</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 11</td>
<td>Perceived Motivations of the Instigators or Perpetrators</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 12</td>
<td>Awareness of Violence or Threats made against any Fellow Councillor/ Ward Committee Member/ Senior Municipal Official/ Municipal Manager</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 13</td>
<td>How often were Threats of Violence made against a fellow Councillor/ Ward Committee Member/ Senior Municipal Official/ Municipal Manager During the Past 2 Years?</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 14</td>
<td>What Type of Remedial Actions were you Offered to Deal with your Loss or Trauma?</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 15</td>
<td>Violence and Threats Prevent Councillors/ Ward Committee Members/ Senior Municipal Officials/ Municipal Managers from Effectively Carrying out their Duties</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 16</td>
<td>Violence and Threats Prevent Councillors from Running for Office Again</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 17</td>
<td>Violence or Threats Impact Negatively on my Family</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 18</td>
<td>Actual Exposure to Violence or Threat by ‘How Safe do you Feel when you are Doing your Job as a Councillor/ Ward Committee Member/ Senior Municipal Official/ Municipal Manager?’ (n=375)</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 19</td>
<td>Are you Satisfied with the Existing Safety Mechanisms in your Municipality?</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 20</td>
<td>What do you think can be done to Improve the Safety of Councillors/ Ward Committee Members/ Senior Municipal Officials/ Municipal Managers?</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 21</td>
<td>What was the Issue Stated as the Cause of the Protest?</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FIGURES

Figure 1 Political violence per year.................................................................................................................. 37
Figure 2 Assassination and attempts in election years ....................................................................................... 38
Figure 3 Political violence per province ............................................................................................................ 39
Figure 4 Assassinations of Councillors per province ............................................................................................ 40
Figure 5 Political violence per municipality ....................................................................................................... 40
Figure 6 Proportional analysis of peril claims ...................................................................................................... 44
Figure 7 Peril by year........................................................................................................................................... 44
Figure 8 Value of peril claims for 2013–2018 ........................................................................................................ 45
Figure 9 Frequency of claims per municipality (Top 10) ..................................................................................... 47
Figure 10 Survey sample characteristics ........................................................................................................... 51
Figure 11 Experience of violence by gender, province, municipality type and occupation............................. 52
Figure 12 Type of threat or harm experienced .................................................................................................... 53
Figure 13 Early warnings, targeting and knowledge of perpetrators .................................................................. 54
Figure 14 Perceived motivations of the instigators or perpetrators ................................................................... 55
Figure 15 How did you deal with the threat or violence? ..................................................................................... 56
Figure 16 Outcomes after reporting or action in response to threats ................................................................. 57
Figure 17 Remedial actions...................................................................................................................................... 57
Figure 18 Perceived effects of the threats or violence .......................................................................................... 59
Figure 19 Safety and protection of Councillors/ Managers/ Officials/ Ward Committees .................................... 60
Figure 20 Was the municipality notified of the protest action in accordance with the Regulation of Gatherings Act? ...................................................................................................................... 62
Figure 21 Magnitude and cause of recent protests in municipalities ..................................................................... 62

MAPS

Map 1 Provincial Poverty Share (UBPL) for 2015 (Source: Stats SA, 2017). .......................................................... 26
Map 2 Provincial Dimension of Political Violence.................................................................................................. 38
Map 3 Richmond Municipality by Ward.................................................................................................................. 67
Map 4 City of Cape Town Electoral Wards............................................................................................................ 77
Municipalities are a means through which sustainable development and service delivery must be realized. These institutions are a critical component of government better placed to work with citizens and groups within communities to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and material needs and improve the quality of their lives as envisaged in the White Paper on Local Government (1998). In municipalities, there are councillors, municipal officials and also community members who have a legislative mandate to work together to achieve local government constitutional mandate of ensuring that citizens have access to clean drinking water, electricity, sanitation, houses and internal roads.

Over the past few years since the advent of democratic local government elections in 2000, we have as SALGA, observed a worrying trend developing of killing and intimidation of councillors, municipal officials, ward committee members and their families. Municipal property and properties belonging to councillors, municipal officials and ward committees have also been a target for destruction during community protests. These worrying and unfortunate developments could not be left to continue as they threatened the stability and the democratic legitimacy of the local government sector. The SALGA leadership in its various governance platforms identified killings of councillors, municipal officials and ward committee members as well as destruction of their property and property belonging to municipalities as a serious threat to democracy and existence of municipalities. SALGA then commissioned studies in 2016, which later became the baseline for a fully flashed study commissioned in 2018, to examine incidents of killing of councillors, municipal officials and ward committee members and destruction of municipal and individuals’ properties from 2000 to 2018.

The study was commissioned through the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), and the outcomes were made available after a lengthy period of extensive consultation and research in a report entitled: “Violence in Democracy: A Study on Damage to Property, Intimidation, Threats, Harm, and Killing of Councillors and Municipal Officials”. The outcomes of the study reflects to us as South Africans, and the rest of the world, a painful, emotional and a sad reality of the loss of lives, intimidations and destruction of property that the local government sector incurred. The figures mentioned in the study, of councillors, municipal managers, senior managers and ward committees, murdered, intimidated, threatened, and whose properties and assets have been destroyed, are not of fictional characters, they are of real people and are extremely shocking.

This study falls within SALGA’s 2017 – 2022 strategy, of constructively disrupting and protecting so as to attract attention on matters that require our collective response, like the ills that the study brings to our attention. It is when everybody is paying attention, and becoming aware of the plight of our councillors, municipal managers, senior managers and ward committee members that we will be able to organise and protect the sector better.
OVERVIEW: SALGA CEO

Local government as a sector has witnessed, against many positive developments, some serious attacks and setbacks with devastating effects including the loss of lives and destruction of individuals’ as well as municipal properties. The killing of councillors, officials, ward committee members and the destruction of their property has a negative impact on the functionality and stability of the sector and municipalities in particular. The negative developments observed are some of the darkest spots in our history and are a serious threat to democracy, and a reversal of our gains as a nation.

SALGA’s study on, “Violence in Democracy: A Study on Damage to Property, Intimidation, Threats, Harm, and Killing of Councillors and Municipal Officials”, conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), is a response which must raise the alarm about the plight of the local government sector. The objectives of the study are:

- To update the 2016 SALGA study on the killing of councillors and senior municipal officials with more comprehensive qualitative and quantitative data
- To create a historical database of councilors and municipal officials killed, harmed and threatened from 2000 to 2018
- To document for the purpose of descriptive and quantitative, actual instances of intimidation, harm and property damage experienced by councilors and local government practitioners across the Republic of South Africa since 2000 to 2018.

The outcomes of the study must oblige us as a nation to pause and take stock of where we went wrong in order to make necessary corrections. The study provides us with real facts that since 2000 to 2018, eighty nine (89) councillors and two (2) municipal officials have been killed. This should be reason enough to bring us all closer together to map out a way forward on how we will protect and take care of our leaders, officials and property belonging either to the individuals, municipalities and private sector.

Impact of the violence and killings of these key role players in municipalities is also felt by families and communities from where they come. The loss of loved ones had serious impact to all the families in that, they lost fathers, mothers, sons and daughters, and worst, some lost breadwinners. Children of those killed were denied various opportunities in life, such as knowing that there is somebody who will be there to help them achieve their dreams. The society lost leaders whom they relied on for the betterment of their lives.

The findings of the study as presented before us, should compel us as SALGA, working with municipalities, government, business, communities and civil society organisations and all development partners, to appreciate our leaders and officials more, and to put mechanisms in place to protect them. These findings and the recommendations provide us with the necessary facts as the local government sector to argue convincingly that more resources need to be made available to improve the welfare and safety of the sector in general, but of the councillors, municipal officials and ward committees in particular.

Mr. Xolile George
SALGA CEO
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

South Africa is experiencing a rise in local government-related political violence directed at Councillors, Municipal Managers, Senior Municipal Officials and Members of Ward Committees. The threats and violence are often accompanied by damage to property, which undermine institutional performance and the functionality of municipalities. In the light of the growing number of acts of political violence against the sphere of Local Government, the South African Local Government Association (SALGA) conducted a baseline study of the killings, harm and threats experienced by Councillors and Municipal Managers during the period 2000 to 2016. The study (SALGA 2016) found that the violence that occurred country wide, although with different intensities, threatens democracy and hampers effective service delivery. In order to follow-up on the disturbing trends that emerged from the SALGA baseline study, SALGA commissioned the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) to conduct further research as an update to the 2016 SALGA study and to develop a historical database for the period 2000 to 2018.

Conceptualisation

For the purpose of this study, harm is defined as ‘violent contact or threats against an official, in any form of unwelcome physical conduct that causes physical pain, harm or injury to a person, or damage to their property’. A threat is ‘any form of speech made by a person against an official that indicated a willingness to perform an act that causes physical pain, injury or damage to their property’.

Historical Database

The HSRC has compiled a historical database of Councillors and Municipal Officials’ killing, harm and threats for the period 2000 to 2018. This database draws on (i) news clippings from an electronic database, Sabinet; (ii) the SALGA database on councillor killings and intimidation; and (iii) on web-based information, municipalities were also consulted to comment and validate information compiled. Analysis in this section focused on political violence that affected municipal Councillors, Municipal Managers, Senior Municipal Officials and local level politicians such as the youth league and party representatives.

One of the main findings of the research is that a disturbingly high number of 89 Councillors were assassinated over the period 2000 to 2018. These assassinations have increased over time and have peaked in 2016/17. In addition, twelve (12) attempted assassinations of Councillors were recorded in our media analysis. There is a high correlation between peaks in political assassinations, attempted assassinations and years when local elections take place. The years post municipal elections have usually been particularly violent with different intensities.

Comparably, Municipal Managers and Senior Municipal Officials were significantly less affected by political violence, but did not stay untouched. Two Municipal Managers and two Senior Municipal Officials were assassinated during the period under review.

KwaZulu-Natal Province stands out as the province where Councillors are particularly under siege. The overall picture painted is that the assassination of Councillors is a problem that touches all provinces but especially KwaZulu-Natal. Overall, Ethekwini Metro featured as the area worst affected by political violence with the highest number of assassinations and attempted assassinations.
Political violence has led to injuries of a number of politicians over time. Those residing in North West and Western Cape Provinces have been the worst affected by this type of violence. The Western Cape had the highest frequency of reports of violent threats against local level politicians, followed by KwaZulu-Natal in second place. Interestingly, damage to property of politicians did not feature as prominently in KwaZulu-Natal but dominated in provinces such as Mpumalanga, Gauteng and Free State.

The data captured in the historical database provides an approximate indication of the problem of damage to property, intimidation, threats, harm and killings to Councillors, Senior Municipal Officials, Municipal Managers and ward committee members. However, owing to limitations such as the accuracy of reporting, the underreporting of incidents of damage to property, intimidation and threats that were not reported or not covered by the media, and for other reasons, the true extent of acts of violence may be underestimated in this data set. Nevertheless, reports of killings of Councillors may be regarded as reasonably accurate owing to the wide media coverage of such incidents.

**SASRIA Database**

The South African Special Risk Insurance Agency (SASRIA) provided SALGA with a high-level dataset for the period 2013-2018 on incidents of municipal property destruction and loss. The dataset included “peril” which comprised of political riot, non-political riot and strike-related damage and claims, which were paid out for the period under review. The HSRC analysis of the dataset revealed the following trends:

For the period 2014 to 2018, the value of political riot-related claims consistently reduced from year to year and comprised 16% of total claims. During the period, 2013 to 2018 there was a general increase in non-political claims while the value of strike-related claims reduced for the period 2013 to 2018. However, 2017 marked a significant exception to the general trend of lower strike related claims. The total damage pay out for all types of political related incidents for the period 2013-2018 was valued at R61 million (rounded). Of this amount, service delivery (political) related incidents were by far the most expensive and contributed to R57 million of damage payouts. Other political related incidents were less significant but included damage due to political elections (R3.8 million), riots with a political objective (R361 000), political celebrations (R 29 000) and targeting of office bearers (R157 000).

Of the top ten municipalities with the highest frequency of claims, five were metros, namely Ekurhuleni, Buffalo City, Nelson Mandela Bay, Ethekwini and Tshwane. The top ten highest claims for municipalities ranged from R5 million to R50 million. Mangaung and Govan Mbeki municipalities had the highest overall claims which exceeded R20 million but not R50 million. In total the damage pay out for all types of incidents was valued at R392 million for the period under review.

**The Survey Questionnaire**

The HSRC survey of the experiences of violence by Councillors, Ward Committee Members and Municipal Officials conducted on behalf of SALGA, yielded responses from 448 respondents during the period November 2018 to March 2019. The respondents comprised 58% Councillors, 25% Municipal Officials, 10% Members of Ward Committees, 3% Municipal Managers and 4% not specified. Officials from all provinces participated, with the largest proportions in Gauteng (20%), Eastern Cape (20%) and Western Cape (15%), and in a gender ratio of 41% female to 59% male participation. Almost two-thirds (64%) were based within local municipalities, 25% in metros and 11% in district municipalities. Most were aged either over 50 years (40%) or 41 to 50 years (33%) and almost half (43%) had worked in their positions for less than six years.
A large proportion (69%) of those who responded to the survey indicated that they had been exposed to some sort of violence or threat related to their work in local government. We speculate that such respondents would have been more easily able to relate to research about such exposure and would want to share information about it. Among those who responded, those most likely to have experienced a threat or violence were Councillors (76%) and respondents in metro municipalities (84%), as well as those based in the Northern Cape (86%), North West (80%), Gauteng (80%) and KwaZulu-Natal (77%). The most frequent harm to which respondents were exposed was a threat (56%). More said that there had been no early warnings or signs of possible violence beforehand (40%) than those who said there had been prior warnings (38%). More than half (55%) of those who reported harm or violence indicated that it had been directed at themselves personally while about two-thirds of respondents (64%) said that they had experienced a threat or violence more than once.

The main sources of threats or violence were from community members (63%); members of political parties (39%), businesspersons (8%) or members of trade unions (8%), and almost three-fifths (58%) of respondents knew the perpetrators. Frustration about lack of municipal service delivery (49%) was perceived to be the main motive for the threat or violence, with other motivations being perceived as general criminality (24%), and municipal elections (22%), among others. Just over one quarter (26%) of those who had been exposed to a threat or violence had reported the matter to the police; 23% reported it to the police as well as their council; 20% only to the council, and 2% had obtained private security. Almost half (49%) of respondents indicated that nothing had happened after they had reported the incidents, while 21% said that the threats or violence had stopped; 7% said that the perpetrators were arrested, and 5% said that more violence had occurred. For more than a quarter (26%) of the victims of threat or violence said, that it had been ‘very difficult’ and for 21% it had been ‘difficult’ to obtain formal assistance. Conversely, only 8% said it had been ‘easy’ and 5% that it had been ‘very easy’ to get formal assistance. The assistance received comprised counselling (18%), legal protection (11%), replacement or rebuilding of property (4%), hospitalisation (3%) or financial compensation (1%). However, a substantial proportion (27%) was not offered any remedial action to deal with their loss or trauma. Unsurprisingly therefore, 50% of respondents felt that the remedial actions they were offered were not satisfactory.

Almost three-quarters (73%) were of the view that ‘violence and threats prevent Councillors/ Ward Committee Members/ Senior Municipal Officials/ Municipal Managers from effectively carrying out their duties’ and 61% felt that ‘violence and threats prevent Councillors from running for office again’. Similarly, 73% agreed that ‘Violence or threats impact negatively on my family’. An alarming 62% indicated that they feel unsafe or very unsafe while doing their local government jobs. Consequently, it is also no surprise that 56% of respondents do not feel protected by their municipal council whereas 60% are not satisfied with the existing safety mechanisms in their municipality. In search of remedies, 43% felt that their council should improve security measures at the municipal premises or at their home. Other comments were that municipalities should commit to service delivery (7%), justice (5%), proper investigation and engagement (4%) and the creation of community awareness (3%).

Asked about recent protest actions, 30% said that the municipality had been notified and 33% that it had not been notified in compliance with the Regulation of Gatherings Act. Almost half (47%) indicated that the cause of protests was service delivery; 15% attributed them to economic development issues; 6% to political issues; 4% to corruption; and 11% to other issues.
In order to have a nuanced understanding of the causes, nature and impact of political violence, Richmond Local Municipality with high levels of violence and the City of Cape Town Metropolitan Municipality (Atlantis) with lower level of violence were selected as case studies.

The culture of violence and the legacy of corruption are not unique to Richmond but also reflect on similar problems that have been experienced in other parts of KwaZulu-Natal where high levels of political intolerance and violence are the norm. However, the inter-party animosity that marked the advent of democracy until the early 2000s made way for a different type of violence, namely intra-party violence.

Respondents in the Richmond municipal area highlighted a number of key reasons for political violence. Firstly, intra-party contestation for power was believed to be an important reason for violence. Apparently, there is strong competition for positions within party structures owing to the alleged opportunity it provides for access to resources and furthering of business interests. Secondly, practices around the tendering system to secure services, infrastructure and goods were also raised as a key issue in relation to political violence at the Richmond municipality. Seemingly, senior officials and politicians unduly influence the outcome of tenders for personal benefit. Thirdly, unemployment and a general lack of job opportunities in the Richmond municipal area may also contribute to political violence. The perception exists that being a councillor implies that prospective candidates will gain employment and earn a good salary. Competing candidates may therefore resort to any means, including violence, to be elected as a councilor due to worsening socio-economic conditions of the country. Fourthly, both the lack of development and service delivery were raised as reasons for political violence. For example, frustrated community members may often damage the property of Ward Councillors to whom they ascribe the lack of development or service delivery in the area.

Political violence in the Richmond municipal area is mostly directed towards politicians (Ward Councillors) owing to their executive powers in the municipal council, including the adjudication of tenders. Similarly, senior Municipal Managers are also at risk due to their involvement in the adjudication of tenders. Ward committee members are to a lesser extent victims of political violence.

The research conducted in the Richmond municipal area revealed that threats, including death threats, are commonly used to influence, intimidate and scare Ward Councillors, senior municipal management and to a lesser extent ward committee members. While some respondents did not expect threats, others foresaw problems due to their involvement in politics and warnings received. Many of the respondents were unfamiliar with the perpetrators of violent acts against them especially since third parties are often involved to carry out these violent acts.

The research identified various impacts of political violence on politicians and Municipal Officials in the Richmond municipal area. Notably, that political violence has a psychosocial impact on the victims, their families and members of the community. Political violence had a negative effect on the ability of politicians and Municipal Officials to carry out their duties as it restricts their freedom of movement in the Richmond area. It threatens or puts their political careers potentially at risk. The political violence in the Richmond area caused distrust between politicians and their Senior Municipal Officials.
Political violence has other impacts on Richmond, including for example, its detrimental effect on service delivery in the municipality. Some senior officials resigned due to acts of violence in the municipality. This resulted in a lack of capacity at senior level, which negatively affected service delivery. In addition, political violence influenced decision-making and the adoption of resolutions in the Municipal Council due to perceptions that matters discussed in the Council informed some killings. Protection services were reported as being limited, with bodyguards only provided to selected senior politicians and Municipal Officials. Finally, the need for protection services for politicians and officials has a negative impact on the municipal budget and available resources.

**City of Cape Town (Atlantis) Case Study**

Violence across the local government system is widespread. Cilliers and Aucoin (2016) state that, “While all violence is technically social as it is carried out in and by society, political aspirations and motivation are what makes violence political or public – i.e. violent protests against local government and political assignations and xenophobic attacks”.

The findings indicate that politicised violence in the City of Cape Town Metropolitan municipality (Atlantis) include violence or threats of violence directed at Ward Councillors and Municipal Managers, damage to their homes and cars; and violence or threats of harm to their families. Similarly, violence targeted administrative officials working within local government. This finding resonates with the previous research commissioned by SALGA (Violence and Democracy, 2016) but gives a descriptive and personal account of its effects on Ward Councillors and Senior Municipal Managers.

The reasons for the use of violence seem to be two-fold. On the one hand, violence is attributable to perceptions of lack of service delivery and on the other hand, violence seems to be politically motivated. In the first instance, violence is mobilised through a collective crowd and is indiscriminate. In the second instance, violence targets a specific individual who is perceived as responsible and must be held accountable.

Ward Councillors interface directly with the communities and often blamed for service delivery failures, thus bearing the brunt of the anger and frustration of local communities. It was also not always clear whether the motivation for violence, threats and intimidation was political, or whether it was merely aggrieved community members acting out of frustration and aggression because of poor service delivery. Councillors believed that one of the key reasons for frustration and anger about service delivery centres on the existence of unrealistic expectations by communities. There is seemingly a lack of understanding on the part of the communities of service delivery-related processes and procedures that need to be followed at local sphere of government. Communities are seemingly also angered by the appointment of incompetent officials to government positions, and the resultant impact thereof on service delivery.

Ward Councillors also described the effect of the violence, including the effect on their families. The responsibility of dealing with violence is located within the city, and is focused on securitisation and the use of panic buttons or security officers. There seems to be a need for an approach that include debriefing sessions, particularly for Ward Councillors based within communities, after incidents of violence.
Conclusion

In conclusion, the report on violence and threats in the local government sphere found that local government Councillors frequently experience violence and threats. This is in accordance with both survey and findings from the Richmond and Atlantis case studies, which indicate that political violence mostly affects Ward Councillors. Similarly, an analysis of the historical database for the period 2000 to 2018 showed that 89 Councillors had been assassinated, and twelve attempted assassinations were recorded. KwaZulu-Natal stands out as the province where Councillors are particularly under siege owing to political violence, with the highest number of Councillors assassinated. Ethekwini Metro is the area worst affected by political violence, with the highest number of assassinations and attempted assassinations.

Results from the historical database, the Richmond and City of Cape Town (Atlantis) case studies and the survey indicated that municipal managers and Senior Municipal Officials are also at risk of political violence although to a lesser extent than Councillors are. Similarly, ward committee members are sometimes victims of political violence. A threat or killing to one is a cause of concern no matter what statistics portray. It is a matter to be prioritised and escalated to national level.

More than half of the survey respondents who reported harm or violence indicated that they had been targeted personally. This finding is confirmed by the respective case studies and is revealed in the historical database. Research conducted in the Richmond municipal area revealed that threats, including death threats, are commonly used to influence, intimidate and scare Ward Councillors and senior municipal management. Likewise the survey results showed that the most frequent harm to which respondents reported having been exposed was a threat. Smaller numbers have experienced actual physical harm and damage to property. The Atlantis case study noted that threats of harm directed at both Councillors and senior municipal management were reported more often than direct attacks. In addition, respondents of the study also experienced damage to their homes and cars.

Many of the Richmond respondents were not familiar with the perpetrators of violent acts against them especially since third parties were often used to carry out these violent acts. Survey results, however, revealed that the main sources of violence or threats were from community members and members of political parties while more than half of the respondents knew the perpetrators. The Atlantis case study suggests that community members, among others, may be the perpetrators although it is sometimes unclear whether the acts of violence are not mere criminal acts. Results from both the survey and the Richmond case study showed that slightly more respondents indicated that there had been no early warnings or signs of possible violence beforehand than those who said there had been prior warnings.

Survey respondents believed that frustration about a lack of municipal service delivery is the main motive for threats and violence although general criminality and municipal elections also played a role. Similarly, respondents of both Richmond and the City of Cape Town (Atlantis) highlighted lack of service delivery as an important motive for violence. In addition, respondents in Richmond believed that intra-party contestation for power was an important reason for violence while practices around the tendering system to secure services, infrastructure and goods was also raised as a key issue in relation to political violence in Richmond. Unemployment and the lack of job opportunities in the Richmond area may also contribute to political violence as prospective ward council candidates may resort to violence.
The Atlantis case study notes that reasons for the use of violence seem to be two-fold. On the one hand, violence is increasingly because of perceptions of lack of service delivery and on the other hand, violence seems politically motivated. In the first instance, violence is mobilised through a collective crowd and is indiscriminate, and in the second instance, violence is directed at a specific individual who is perceived as responsible and must be held accountable. A finding from the historical database is the high correlation that exists between peaks in political assassinations and attempted assassinations, with years when local government elections take place. The year that follows municipal elections is also particularly violent.

Almost half of survey respondents indicated that nothing was done after they had reported the incidents to the police and or the municipal council, with others indicating that they received assistance such as counselling, legal protection, replacement or rebuilding of property, hospitalisation or financial compensation. However, a substantial number of respondents were not offered any remedial action to deal with their loss or trauma. Unsurprisingly half of respondents felt that the remedial actions they were offered were not satisfactory. The Richmond case study revealed similar sentiments on this issue. Participants in the Atlantis case study indicated that although formal charges of act of violence are laid with the police, they believed that the police mostly do not act on these charges. While there was provision for ensuring the physical security of the Ward Councillors and municipal management in the City of Cape Town, Councillors reported that there was no service provision for ‘coping’ and dealing with the resultant emotional trauma. Conversely, municipal management believed that counselling services were indeed available and would be provided upon request.

Respondents from both the survey and the two case studies were of the view that violence and threats prevent politicians and Municipal Officials from effectively carrying out their duties, owing to the impact on their freedom of movement, among other effects. In addition, high numbers of respondents indicated that they feel unsafe while doing their local government jobs. For example, travelling in their municipal areas to visit communities or municipal sites. More than two-thirds of survey respondents felt that ‘Violence and threats prevent Councillors from running for office again’. The Richmond case study revealed that some Senior Municipal Officials resigned because of acts of violence in the municipality. An obvious result is the decline in capacity of the municipality to deliver effective services.

Respondents from the respective case studies as well as more than half of the survey respondents feel vulnerable and are not satisfied with the existing safety mechanisms in their respective municipalities. In search of remedies, it was suggested that their councils need to improve security measures at the municipal premises or at their homes. Municipal management in the City of Cape Town alluded to an existing safety and security protocol in the Metro, which is well implemented. The protocol is focused on securitisation and on the use of security officers and panic buttons.

An analysis from the SASRIA database revealed that the period 2013 to 2018 was a general increase in non-political claims while the value of strike-related claims reduced for the period 2013 to 2018. However, 2017 marked a significant exception to the general trend of lower strike related claims. The total damage pay out for all types of political related incidents for the period 2013-2018 was mostly service delivery (political) related incidents which were by far the most expensive and contributed to R57 million of damage payouts. Overall, the damage pay out for all types of all incidents was valued at R392 million for the period under review and this is worrisome as this money could have been appropriately channelled to improve service delivery.
The study thus indicates that exposure to threats and violence is a common experience among local government Councillors and officials and has increased over time with a high number of assassinations of Ward Councillors. In the short-term, it is essential that municipalities exercise more effective and more compassionate care of officials who have experienced trauma of this nature. Failure to implement appropriate security procedures, reporting methods and remedial mechanisms will have devastating effects on the human resources capacity of municipalities and thus further compound their ongoing struggle to deliver effective services to citizens. In the longer term, the goal should be efficient and smooth-operating municipalities free from political violence. This will ultimately reduce the motives and opportunities for the perpetration of violence or threats against honest and committed local government Councillors, managers, officials and ward committee members. In the main, the study calls for urgent interventions against political violence and an end to threat of political careers of politicians.

**Recommendations**

Against this backdrop, political violence directed at local government Councillors, Municipal Managers, Senior Municipal Officials and Members of Ward Committees has escalated in South Africa. The political killings and damage to property undermine the institutional performance and functionality of municipalities and reverse the gains of democracy. The study created a 2000–2018 historical database of councillor and municipal official killings that includes harm and threats to personnel as well as destruction and loss of municipal property. While all nine provinces were included in the study, the highest number of municipal Councillors assassinated was in KwaZulu-Natal. Failure to introduce and implement appropriate preventive measures will have devastating effects on the morale of Municipal Officials and will severely compromise their ability to manage and implement effective service delivery. The study calls for urgent interventions to address political violence and an end to the threat upon the lives and careers of politicians and officials.

To this end, political killings are a threat to democracy as was pointed out by the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) in the build up towards the 2016 local government, where they stated that politically motivated murders and other acts of intimidation are endangering citizen’s constitutional rights (Khoisan, 2016). This results in the inability of local government to attract suitable, qualified people for employment. SALGA needs to investigate ways to mitigate this phenomenon in the interest of good governance informed the following 15 solid recommendations:

- It is crucial that key recommendations from the Moerane Commission of Inquiry, which focused on KwaZulu-Natal province, should be escalated and applied nationally. According to Moerane Commission (2018:417):
  
  i. Political parties must take responsibility for the violent competition between their members for political positions and power (Moerane Commission, 2018:417).
  
  ii. Political parties should urgently educate their members about democratic practices, especially the universal practice of peaceful political competition as opposed to political intolerance and violent political competition (Moerane Commission, 2018:417).
  
  iii. The State immediately take measures to depoliticise and professionalise the public service. This is in line also with the National Development Plan, Chapter 13 on local government, which also calls for the professionalisation of the public service to prevent the politics of patronage, incumbency and personal accumulation.

- There should be a clearer dichotomy of roles and functions between politicians and administrators so that they do not encroach and overlap each other when delivering services. The distinct roles and functions must then be put into practice in line with the Municipal Structures Act, Act 117 of 1998 without any further delays.
• Political party contestations, factions and factionalism need to be better managed and put under control by political parties, as a means of reducing intra-party violence, intimidation and killings. This is also highlighted in the Moerane Commission of Inquiry. Based on this recommendation, the current party-system must be put on critical scrutiny and review against alternative options on the cards as a long-term measure.

• Councillors need to be aptly supported by SALGA to pursue their studies and further qualifications as a means of increasing their chances of being employed after the expiry of their terms of office. This will reduce the problem of many Councillors who perceive their call of duty as political career opportunism or political ‘careerists’. Gradually, this could reduce the motive for political rivalry and killings over a longer span of time.

• Since the current tendering system in local government was highlighted in the study as one of the main causes of political violence in local municipalities, it needs to be scrutinised and reviewed to determine if the tendering system can be altered in such a way as to eliminate supply chain corruption1.

• As frustration about a perceived lack of municipal service delivery was identified by study participants as an important motive for violence, political or civic, SALGA should regularly encourage municipalities to audit the level of service delivery in the respective municipalities in order to address burning issues as far as possible as an early warning intervention and precaution to potential violence.

• Based on the fact that security measures at council’s premises and the homes of Councillors (as targeted danger zones) are deemed inadequate, it is therefore absolutely necessary that security measures be improved by first conducting proactive security assessments to inform increased budget and alternative innovative security interventions in order to enhance the adequacy of current protection services.

• Support to persons and families affected by political violence, whether emotionally or psychologically, should be made compulsory in the municipalities immediately after a threat or an incident of violence. The support should take the form of debriefing and intensive counselling as therapeutic intervention mechanisms in place.

• There is a need to create synergies between SALGA and the SAPS, through the safety and security cluster and the portfolio committee as an oversight body, to ensure that there is a more and direct concerted effort by the police to act on charges and complaints of violence and acts of intimidation. The culprits must not only be prosecuted but should be publicised to send a good signal to the society to see that justice has been served without fail.

• In the main, SALGA must engage with the National Prosecution Authority to establish the number of offenders that were prosecuted and jailed for assassination of Councillors. This would indicate the extent and veracity of consequences for the killing of Councillors.

• Due to current SASRIA insurance, which only covers Mayors and Councillors against the loss of their property caused by civil commotion, public disorder, strikes, riots and terrorism it is strongly recommended that SASRIA cover should be extended to also include Senior Municipal Officials in their various capacities in the sphere of local government.

• There is a lack of understanding on the part of the communities of processes and procedures, which need to be followed at local government level to facilitate service delivery. The hosting of campaigns to educate communities on these processes and procedures may assist to lessen anger and frustration as well as create a better understanding for the recognition of the important responsibilities and work of politicians and Municipal Officials.

---

• As such, constructive citizen engagement must be prioritised. Meaningful engagement (not as once off or intermittent activity) should accordingly be facilitated between Ward Councillors, ward committee members and community members to enhance effective participatory and developmental local governance in order to reclaim trust in local government and its leaders.

• This research only provides a ‘tip of the iceberg’, and it is recommended that a larger research project be implemented to further assess the nature and incidence of violence and intimidation to Ward Councillors and municipal management through ethnographic lenses. This should also be looked at from a socio-economic context of the prevailing poverty and inequalities in the country. The comprehensive study should also involve political parties as key informants.
1. INTRODUCTION
1. INTRODUCTION

Political violence is generally associated with important political moments of resistance against the state such as South Africa’s transition to democracy. The early years of the South African democracy, particularly during the transition from apartheid to democracy were characterised by political violence that threatened the country’s democratic dispensation (Jarstad and Höglund, 2015). The political violence increased political instability inherited from the apartheid regime. Twenty-five years later, South Africa is experiencing a rise in local government-related political violence directed at Councillors, Municipal Managers, Senior Municipal Officials and Members of Ward Committees (SALGA, 2016). Additionally, most of these threats and violence are accompanied by damage to property, which undermines the institutional performance and functionality of municipalities.

Prior to the present study, and in the light of the growing number of acts of political violence targeting local government, SALGA conducted research on the killings, harm and threats experienced by Councillors and Municipal Managers for the period, 2000 to 2016. The study (SALGA 2016) found that the violence occurred country wide, with different intensities, thereby threatening democracy and hampering effective service delivery. Furthermore, since 2011, 43 Councillors and one municipal manager have been killed in the country. Although the sample size was small (54 Councillors and 40 Municipal Managers) important trends emerged. For example, other politicians and community members with physical harm, damage to property, rape and harm to family members repeatedly threatened 46% of the Councillors in the sample. Furthermore, 60% of Municipal Managers received personal threats. Employees, community members, contractors and union members, threatened Municipal Managers. Approximately two-thirds of Municipal Managers and Councillors in the study indicated that the threats and intimidation towards them affected negatively on their performance resulting in many considering resignation from office.

Due to the disturbing trends that emerged from the abovementioned SALGA baseline study, SALGA commissioned the HSRC to conduct the present study, with the intention of updating the 2016 SALGA study and developing an historical database for the period 2000 to 2018.

The aim of the research is to develop a national database constituted from countrywide documented cases of the killing, harm, intimidation and property loss of local government officials and Municipal Managers. This will entail a thorough review and updating of the SALGA baseline research report to inform a comprehensive research on Councillors, Municipal Officials, and ward committee members as well as political parties to address the numerical and geographical limitations of the sample in the baseline study. The research should be of strategic value to SALGA: i) it should form part of similar interventions to enhance SALGA’s market position as a dependable repository of local government intelligence, ii) it should serve as a sound base for SALGA to stimulate a nation-wide dialogue on the threats that the findings impose on the country’s democracy, iii) it should serve as an advocacy tool for a better understanding of the situation which local government practitioners endure on a daily basis, and iv) the research should enhance SALGA’s active support to municipalities and local government practitioners.
More specifically the objectives of the study are to:

a) update the 2016 study with more comprehensive qualitative and quantitative data,

b) create an historical database of Councillors and Municipal Officials killing, harm and threats (2000-2018), and

c) document for the purposes of description and quantification, actual instances of intimidation, harm and property damage experienced by Councillors and local government practitioners across the Republic of South Africa since 2000.

Many academic writings include the killings of Councillors and Municipal Managers as part of the wider reporting on political killings (SALGA 2016). However, there are no studies that specifically focus on acts of violence and killings against Councillors and Senior Municipal Officials. In addition, there is a gap in literature focusing on intra-party political killings. The literature tends to generalise on political killings, with little distinction made between inter-party and intra-party violence and political killings Bruce (2009; 2014).

The structure of the report is as follows: it starts by providing a contextual framework for the study after which the approach and methodology is described. Thereafter it provides findings derived from the 2000-2018 historical database as well as from the SASRIA database. Next, it presents results from the survey among Councillors, Senior Municipal Officials, Municipal Managers and ward committee members followed by the findings from the case studies conducted in Richmond, KwaZulu Natal and the City of Cape Town (Atlantis), respectively. It concludes with findings and recommendations from the study.
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Background

The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) adopted the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) definition of violence in a recent Research Brief ‘What Drives Violence in South Africa?’ (Brankovic, 2019). Violence is thus defined as “the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, or deprivation” (Brankovic, 2019: 1).

South Africa is known to be a violent country. The 2018 Global Peace Index compiled by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), indicates that South Africa’s reputation as one of the most violent and dangerous places on earth is getting worse (IEP, 2018). In addition, South Africa is described, as being one of the most violent places outside a war-zone (IEP, 2018). According to the Global Peace Index of 2018 South Africa performs very poorly in six key indicators, namely the perception of high levels of criminality; easy access to weapons; relatively high levels of political terror and high levels of violent demonstrations (IEP, 2018). The worst factors though are the high levels of violent crime and homicide (IEP, 2018). For example, when one looks at the Global Peace Index Report of 2018, about societal safety and security, South Africa has a high score of 3.254. It is among one of the worst scores, ranking with countries which are experiencing war or violent conflict like the Democratic Republic of Congo, Libya and Syria which are similarly ranked with a score of three and above (IEP, 2018: 91).

According to the CSVR, research on violence in South Africa shows that the main factors which drive violence in the South African context include, socio-economic inequality, frustrated masculinity, and a lack of social cohesion and that combined with alcohol and firearms, becomes a deadly cocktail (Brankovic, 2019: 5). Furthermore, the CSVR points out that “the injustices implied by displays of wealth amid poverty and high unemployment, gender norms that are difficult to live up to in the absence of resources and life opportunities, and communities fragmented by apartheid legacies and competition for resources create the conditions that enable violence” (Brankovic, 2019:5). This lethal combination, they argue, leads to an increase in the risk of homicide, gender-based violence, youth violence and violence against children, and collective violence in the country (Brankovic, 2019). Given this background, one could argue that political violence is a symptom of a broader societal problem of violence in the South African society and indeed, there may be some overlaps. However, political violence has its own drivers and factors, which are peculiar to it. These factors or key drivers for political violence are explored in the section below.

2.2 Political Violence and Political Killings

Political violence refers to violent actions motivated by political reasons, often resulting in political killings. Historically, political evolution has been characterised by disputes that have led to violence and killings (Torgler & Frey, 2013). Notable high profile politically motivated assassinations over the centuries have included Julius Caesar (Rome, 44 BC), Mahatma Gandhi (New Delhi, 1948), Patrice Lumumba (DRC, 1961), John F. Kennedy (Dallas, 1963), Hendrik Verwoerd (Cape Town, 1966), Luis Carrero Blanco (Madrid, 1973), Anwar al-Sadat (Cairo, 1981), Chris Hani (Boksburg, 1993) and Muammar Gaddafi (Sirte, 2011) (Torgler & Frey, 2013).
Duncan (2010) argues that corruption can be linked to the devolution of state responsibilities, which leads to the outsourcing of state responsibilities. According to Siddle & Koelble (2015), decentralisation can be defined as a process through which powers, functions, responsibilities and resources are relocated from central government to local government as well as other decentralised entities. The decentralisation of political power to subnational state institutions to manage their own resources generates contestation for resources by different interests-groups (Calderón, 2018). In South Africa, the devolution of government and state power was also accompanied by an increase in the number of local level politicians and senior government officials tasked with managing resources. This led to contestation of political positions, particularly among politicians who sought to use political office as means to accumulate resources for themselves. In extreme instances, this political contestation has led to political killings of Ward Councillors.

An important component of decentralisation that relates to this project is political decentralisation, which refers to the devolution of political power to subnational actors such as Ward Councillors (Stanton, 2009). Within developing nations, the devolution of political power and state power is met by competing interests – competing for political power as well as political resources (De Haas, 2016). The competition for political positions and political resources underpins the majority of the political killings in South Africa. As such, a link needs to be made between political decentralisation, fiscal decentralisation and political killings. Since fiscal decentralisation delegates’ financial power and authority to local governments in a neoliberal system that privatised social services, competing interests from different interest groups create space for political violence and killings in the battle for power and ownership of resources. Notably, Bruce (2013) and De Haas (2016) find that many political killings involve business interests.

There are many reasons forwarded for political violence and killings, with leading reasons relating to political and ideological differences (Torgler & Frey, 2013). There is a view that accountable governments limit opportunities for people to seek a policy change by exerting force (Torgler & Frey, 2013). Switzerland is an exemplary accountable society with developed institutions and no history of political violence and assassinations (Torgler & Frey, 2013). On the contrary, poor socio-economic conditions tend to influence competition for positions as means of accessing control to social, political and economic resources. As such, there is high contestation for political positions resulting in political violence perpetuated by different political parties or individuals within the same party.

Politically motivated violence is one of the leading threats to electoral democracies, particularly to emerging democracies. The majority of emerging democracies found in the African continent face high risks of electoral violence due to poor socio-economic conditions that create competition for controlling economic resources (Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 2018). Socio-economic factors such as income inequality may reduce political legitimacy leading to various groups using violence to dispose of government. Regrettably, this result in political instability. This coincides with what is occurring in South Africa as the country faces 27.6% unemployment rate of which youth (aged 15–34 years) account for 63.4% of the total number of unemployed persons in the country, with more than 55% of the country’s population living in poverty as well as increasing inequalities at 0.65 Gini-coefficient (Statistics South Africa, 2019).
Violence in Local Government: A Study on Damage to Property, Intimidation, Threats, Harm, and Killing of Councillors and Municipal Officials

Map 1: Provincial poverty share (UBPL) for 2015 (Source: Stats SA, 2017).

Map 1 portrays the spatial nature of poverty in South Africa per province according to the upper-bound poverty line measure (UBPL). From the map, it is clear that Kwazulu-Natal has the highest proportion (24.4%) of poor people in the country. This is followed by the Eastern Cape (16, 50%), Gauteng (14%) and Limpopo Province (13, 60%). The provinces with the smallest share of poor people are the Northern Cape (2, 30%), the Free State (5, 10%) and the Western Cape with (7, 50%).

To this end, political killings are not necessarily individually motivated, they can be group mediated. Either an opposition party or a local community interest group can motivate for political killings. The act of killings, for example, being gunned down in front of the person’s house and family, speak volumes to the need for a witnessing of the violence that is crucial to effectively deal with the violence.

2.3 Relative Deprivation Theory and Resource Mobilisation Theory

The research on collective action by social psychologists is also rooted in relative deprivation and resource mobilisation theories. According to Crosby (1976), relative deprivation describes the negative emotions experienced by individuals who feel unjustly deprived of something they desire. In terms of Crosby’s model, five preconditions are necessary and sufficient for relative deprivation to occur. In the first instance, one needs to see that someone else possesses X (a desired good). In the second instance, one should want X. One should also feel that one deserves X and that it is feasible to obtain X. Finally, one should lack a sense of responsibility for failure to possess X (Crosby, 1976). According to Clayton and Crosby (1992), comparison between one’s situation and that of another may be based on an awareness that the two individuals belong to the same group or to different groups. This theory is appropriate for explaining service delivery protests – related to communities feeling deprived of services.
Resource mobilisation theory (McCarthy & Zald, 1977) on the other hand, holds that social movements emerge when economic and material resources are banded together in pursuit of a particular cause. According to Jenkins (1983), a number of principles underpin resource mobilisation theory. The first is that the actions of members belonging to social movements are rational. Secondly, a social movement’s actions are strongly influenced by institutionalised power imbalances and conflict of interest. These are sufficient to generate grievances that lead to the mobilisation of the social movement’s intent on changing the distribution of resources. Centralised and formally structured social movements are more effective at mobilising resources and achieving change than are decentralised and informal social movements. Finally, group strategy and political climate exert a heavy influence on success of social movements (Jenkins, 1983).

What do these theories mean in relation to the political acts of intimidation and political killings? On an individual level, the theories of frustration-aggression and relative deprivation can be motives for violence in the context of poverty, unemployment and inequalities. However, this does not fully explain the premeditated planned killings of specific government officials. Hence, the theories of resource mobilisation provide deeper insights into the individual and collective motivations and rewards of the offenders in political killings. This is because the theory puts resources at the epicentre of contestation, particularly in the political landscape.

2.4 Political Violence in the South African Context

Political violence is often characteristic of big political moments of resistance against the state. For example, South Africa’s transition to democracy. The early years of the South African democracy, particularly during the transition from apartheid to democratic dispensation were marked by political violence that threatened the country’s democratic dispensation (Jarstad and Höglund, 2015). The political violence increased political instability inherited from the apartheid regime. Twenty-five years later, there is a rise in local government-related political violence against politicians and Senior Municipal Officials and damage to property, which undermine institutional performance and the functionality of municipalities (SALGA, 2016). In the build up towards the 2016 local government elections, the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) stated that politically motivated murders and other acts of intimidation are endangering citizen’s constitutional rights (Khoisan, 2016). This results in the inability of local government to attract human capital for employment.

De Haas (2016) writes that it is not easy to delineate political killings due to a lack of credible information. While it is generally accepted that killings involving politicians are easily categorised as political killings, in some instances, business interests also drive violent political killings. However, some cases are a clear case of political violence. For example, KwaZulu-Natal has a history of political violence in the form of clashes between different political parties in the province. The province experienced more than 4000 deaths between 1994 and 1998 (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1998).

It is important to make a distinction between political violence and political killings although political violence often leads to political killings. Political violence refers to the utilisation of violent means in the contestation of political ideas, political power, and control of resources and so forth. Political killings on the other hand refer to killings associated with contestation over political power (Bruce, 2009; 2013). The majority of political killings involve rivalry of political parties, for example, in KwaZulu-Natal. An area like Nongoma which is highly politicized, has limited space for political tolerance. Killings between 1994 and 2000 are widely documented by authors such as De Haas (2016) and Bruce (2013; 2014), particularly in areas such as Richmond in KwaZulu-Natal. Over 220 political killings in South Africa between 1994 and 1996, more than 170 took place in KwaZulu-Natal (Bruce, 2013). The worst political killings occurred in the period of 1990 to 1994, where thousands of people were killed through political violence.
While the country has moved on from the traditional political violence that involved rivalry political parties, there has been a rise in political violence towards local government officials, particularly Councillors and Senior Municipal Officials. The study conducted by SALGA (2016) revealed that 66% of Councillors were threatened, with 46% reporting to have been frequently threatened. The majority of Councillors indicated that the threats hindered their ability to perform their functions. The report also states that Speakers and Chief Whips are more likely to be threatened by different political parties, unions and even their own political party (SALGA, 2016). These threats and acts of violence also extended to Senior Municipal Officials, particularly Municipal Managers. More than 60% of Municipal Managers were reported to having been threatened.

There is a lack of documentation on political killings in the South African landscape owing to the ambiguity and ambivalence in defining political killings as well as a lack of information regarding the motive behind some killings.

2.5 Key Reasons behind Political Killings

The lack of political tolerance has played an essential role in political killings. For example, in KwaZulu-Natal, this was evident in the split of a certain political party and the subsequent formation of a new political party. This was accompanied by political assassinations of high-ranking officials in areas such as Nongoma and KwaMashu.

Leading reasons for threatening Municipal Managers and Senior Municipal Officials relate to employment, tenders and salaries (SALGA, 2016). As such, threats and assassins are carried out against Municipal Managers and other senior officials who have a direct say in tenders and employment opportunities. Notably, Municipal Managers are the head of administration and accounting officers of municipalities (Municipal Systems Act, No. 32 of 2000). Hence, they are easy targets. Further to this, Municipal Managers act as the communication link between the council and administration and are prone to political pressure from different and conflicting political interest. Other senior officials such as Chief Financial Officers are also prone to threats as custodians of public funds of the municipality as proclaimed in section 81(1) (a) of the Municipal Finance Management Act, 2003.

South African municipalities are also experiencing a rise in property destruction that can be attributed to two factors. The first factor is the destruction of property as an act of intimidation towards certain public officials such as Ward Councillors and Senior Municipal Officials. The main reason behind property destructions as means of threats are related to competition for socio-economic opportunities and resources that are managed by local authorities and Senior Municipal Officials (Von Holt, 2014). The second factor is related to the inability of municipalities to deliver basic services, which has led to a rise of violent and destructive service delivery protests throughout the country.

Some threats are associated with intra-party factions during local government elections due to different candidates who view local government positions as means of accessing and exploiting resources for their own selfish interest. The latest trend has been evident in the manipulation of party lists within parties. De Haas (2016) indicates that there has been a rise in the manipulation of party lists which results in violence among different factions. In KwaZulu-Natal, such factions have led to the assassination of various Councillors, subsequently undermining electoral democracy. Similar cases are evident in provinces such as the Western Cape and the North West. Homes of Ward Councillors in KwaDukuza and South Coast were torched as means of intimidation, while municipal buildings were also torched and looted in Folweni.
Most literature on political violence and political killings in South Africa as well as internationally focuses on inter-party political violence. In South Africa, this is evident in the historic political killings resulting from inter-party dynamics. However, recent developments show that political killings are increasingly driven by intra-party dynamics. The leading reason behind intra-party political violence and political killings is the contestation over political power. Bruce (2009; 2014) argues that the key motive behind these killings is linked to the value of public office. Nowhere is this more evident than in the political killings during the local government elections in 2016 and the political killings leading up to the ANC elective conference. The contestation is intensified by the lack of qualifications by many politicians, thereby leading to politicians being protective of their positions and political turfs to the extent of eliminating their competitors (de Haas, 2016; Bruce, 2013). The fusion of politics and business through Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policies led to an intimate relationship developing between political power and material accumulation, where election to public office is viewed as the quickest way to achieving wealth (Duncan, 2010). The so called ‘career politicians’ must be discouraged. Politicians must be seen as holders of public offices to serve the interest of the society over that of their personal interests.

Political killings in the local sphere of government are not only evident in South Africa, but throughout developing nations. Von Holt (2014) writes that political killings and intimidations are common in many developing nations because of poor socio-economic conditions – poverty and inequalities. Mexico has been experiencing a wave of political violence that has claimed the lives of more than 150 mayors, mayoral candidates and former mayors from 2004 to 2017 (Calderón, 2018). A rise in political violence accompanied by the assassination of local authorities and threats to the lives of public officials might lead to fragilities in local state politics. These fragilities also add to the rapid rise in violent and destructive protests accompanied by the burning of public and private infrastructure.

There is a link between political killings and corruption. The National Development Plan (NDP) identifies corruption as a leading challenge facing the South African government (National Planning Commission, 2012). A clear example is the case of Sindiso Magaqa who was assassinated after exposing corruption in his local municipality in UMzimkhulu (Mail and Guardian, 2018). Other similar examples have occurred in KwaZulu-Natal during the 2018 period, signalling the impact of corruption in political violence and political assassins in South Africa.

2.6 Lack of Credible and Documented Information on Political Killings

The killing of Councillors, senior Municipal Managers and destroying of municipal infrastructure as well as houses of officials as a form of intimidation has far-reaching consequences for local politics. SALGA’s (2016) study is important in informing trends related to political killings and intimidations at the subnational state level. However, there is no database documenting political killings and threats from 2000 to 2016. SALGA’s (2016) study was limited to 54 Councillors and 40 Municipal Managers, a sample that only gives a glimpse of the challenges faced by these public officials at the local level, highlighting the need for a nationwide study that documents all the political killings and intimidation as well as their impact on the performance of individuals and municipalities.

In addition to the absence of data on political killings in South Africa from 2000 to 2016, there is also a gap in literature focusing on intra-party political killings. Bruce (2009; 2014) writes that since 2000, the majority of political killings have been driven by inter-party and intra-party dynamics. The literature tends to generalise political killings, with little distinction being made between inter-party and intra-party violence and political killings. As such, it is equally important to document political killings in terms of intra- and inter-party political killings to determine different reasons and dynamics influencing political killings.
Bruce (2013) argues that violence is internalised in South Africa. This is evident in violent community protests accompanied by the burning of municipal buildings or homes of Ward Councillors. Some of these violent acts are related to the failure of municipalities to deliver services as well as the lack of proper communication between Ward Councillors and citizens. Violence in communities can either be classified as communal or political violence, depending on the motivation for the group violence or group dynamics. There is a faint line though in differentiating between intimidations related to political disputes versus intimidations related to displeasure in the political leadership by the community. As such, it is equally important to make a distinction between these two factors to accurately document political killings. These are immediate points that are important in distilling already available information on political violence and killings in the South African context.
3. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY
3. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

Approach

The main objectives of the research are to update the 2016 SALGA study with more quantitative and qualitative components, including the development of an historical database for the period, 2000 to 2018. These objectives can be achieved by using an inclusive methodology such as a mixed method design. By its nature, a mixed method design improves the integration of quantitative and qualitative data in a single investigation. The principle of this methodology is that it permits a more complete and synergistic utilisation of data than would have been the case with separate quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis. Specifically the design helps researchers to apply either quantitative or qualitative methods, or both, where they are needed. The four techniques which were applied in this study include (i) document, database and media analysis; (ii) a quantitative survey (online, and hardcopies distributed at SALGA Governance Working Group meetings) of Municipal Managers, Senior Municipal Officials, Ward Councillors and ward committee members; (iii) in-depth interviews with selected Municipal Managers, Senior Municipal Officials, Ward Councillors and ward committee members in the Richmond local municipality and in the City of Cape Town Metropolitan Municipality, respectively; and (iv) focus group interviews with ward committee members in the City of Cape Town (Atlantis).

The Research Ethics Committee of the HSRC approved the research study. The HSRC Ethics Committee reviewed all instruments, consent forms and ethical considerations. Individuals that were engaged in the study were invited to participate in the research after the nature and the purpose of the research were explained to them and they had given written consent. They were also assured of anonymity and confidentiality at all times.

3.1 Document, Database and Media Analysis

Historical Database, 2000-2018

To create the historical database, the HSRC research team collected and assessed literature and media-based sources that documented intimidation, threats, harm and killings of Councillors, Senior Municipal Officials, Municipal Managers and ward committee members and incidents of damage to property. This was used to update the 2016 baseline list of Councillors and Municipal Managers who were threatened or had been killed while in office. For comparative purposes, and to update the 2016 study, political killings are broadly analysed according to province, municipality, year, and Councillors/Municipal Officials.

The 2000 - 2018 historical database compiled by the HSRC draws on news clipping from an electronic database, Sabinet; and on the SALGA database on Councillors’ killings and intimidation. Sabinet covers 39 publications in the printed media comprising of daily and weekend publications, two weekly and one monthly publication. Local, regional and national news are covered in these publications. SALGA’s database was populated by information received from the provinces and contains information obtained from municipalities and newspaper articles. The following search terms were used: political killing, politicians killed, political assassination, property destruction, councillor assassination, councillor killing, councillor intimidation, councillor threats, councillor property destruction, municipal official killing, municipal official property destruction, municipal official threats, and service delivery protest.
The data captured in the historical database\(^1\) provides an approximate indication of the problem of damage to property, intimidation, threats, harm and killings to Councillors, Senior Municipal Officials, Municipal Managers and ward committee members. However, limitations such as for example, the accuracy of reporting, underreporting of incidents of damage to property, intimidation and threats not reported or not covered by the media, imply that the true extent of acts of violence may be underestimated in this data set. Nevertheless, reports of killings of Councillors may be regarded as reasonably accurate due to good media coverage of such incidents.

**SASRIA Database**

SASRIA provided the HSRC with a high-level dataset for the period 2013-2018 on incidents of municipal property destruction and loss. The dataset contains information on the claimant (municipality), value of claims made, details or reasons for incidents (perils) as well as the date of incidents.

### 3.2 The Survey Questionnaire

In consultation with SALGA, the HSRC designed a two-page questionnaire to be administered to respondents online, as well as in hard-copy format. A database of respondents from SALGA’s meeting attendance registers, and from municipality websites was compiled. The questionnaire was then distributed online to the municipal Councillors, Municipal Managers, Municipal Officials and Members of Ward Committees whose names were obtained from the available databases. SALGA distributed hard copies of the questionnaire at various governance meetings during the period November 2018 to March 2019 in all provinces. A substantial proportion of the names and contact details collected turned out to be no longer valid and approximately 10% to 20% of the emailed links to the questionnaire were undelivered. The deadline for completed questionnaires was initially set on 28 February 2019. By this date, 285 responses had been received (164 online and 121 hard copy). The deadline was however extended several times to accommodate the collection of additional hard copy questionnaires that were distributed by SALGA officials in KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape, Gauteng, Limpopo, North West and Free State during March. The final response numbered 448 completed questionnaires. The data were captured and analysed using the Statistical Package of the Social Sciences (SPSS). In conducting the analysis, the missing values were treated as ‘No response’.

### 3.3 In-depth Interviews and Focus Groups

In order to understand the causes, nature and impact of the violence in-depth interviews were conducted with Ward Councillors, ward committee members and Senior Municipal Officials. The interviews, although unstructured, considered the themes that emerged from the literature review and those captured by the online survey. The HSRC conducted interviews in the Richmond Local Municipality, a category B municipality with high levels of violence, and in the City of Cape Town Metropolitan Municipality at the request of SALGA. These two municipalities serve as case studies.

---
\(^1\) SALGA has verified the accuracy of the names of Councillors killed.
In accordance with findings from the HSRC historical database, 2000-2018, which identified KwaZulu-Natal, as the province with the highest number of incidents of political violence, specifically assassinations, KwaZulu-Natal was selected as one of the two provinces for locations of case studies for the project. The HSRC database confirms the results of the 2016 SALGA violence study, which identified KwaZulu-Natal as the province with the highest level of political killings. The choice of KwaZulu-Natal was further motivated by the existence of the Moerane Commission of Inquiry, specifically appointed in 2017 to investigate political killings in KwaZulu-Natal. The location of the second case study was in the City of Cape Town Metropolitan Municipality as suggested by SALGA, and reflective of the HSRC historical database record of seven political assassinations as well as other forms of violence that had occurred in this Metro in the Western Cape.

Within KwaZulu-Natal, Richmond, a Category B municipality in the uMgungundlovu District, was selected as the locality for the case study owing to the historical legacy of political violence in the area. The HSRC historical database confirms high levels of violence in the uMgungundlovu District. This was one of the municipalities in the KwaZulu Natal, which was placed under administration due to governance and service delivery issues. Representatives of KwaZulu-Natal that attended the meeting of the SALGA Councillor Welfare and Empowerment Governance and Intergovernmental Relations Working Group in November 2018 affirmed the selection of Richmond as a case study.

Within the City of Cape Town, the northern residential area of Atlantis was selected as the case study. Atlantis was established during the 1970s as an industrial centre to create employment. However, since the middle of the 1980s subsidies and special incentives were gradually withdrawn resulting in high unemployment and fewer local economic opportunities. Despite being designated as a special economic zone in 2018, aiming to promote development opportunities in the area, frequent service delivery-related violence has continued to challenge the socio-political stability of the area.

In order to undertake the Richmond case study the research team visited Richmond in December 2018 and conducted eleven in-depth interviews with politicians including ward councilors, ward committee members and Senior Municipal Officials. The interviews were conducted by means of open-ended interview schedules. Despite assurance of anonymity of their participation in the study, many participants were reluctant to participate in the study due to the sensitive nature of the research. Although some participants initially agreed to participate in the study, they later declined to participate.

In-depth interviews for the case study in the City of Cape Town (Atlantis) were conducted during March 2019 after the City of Cape Town had granted the HSRC official permission to conduct the study in the Metro. Four interviews with ward councilors and senior Municipal Managers were conducted by means of open-ended interview schedules.

In order to solicit the experiences of ward committee members on the matter of killings, personal harm and the destruction of property in the local government space one focus group discussion was conducted in Atlantis, a suburb of the City of Cape Town. The focus group discussion was used to stimulate a higher level of conversation where participants were actively encouraged to express their views. This approach facilitated a higher level of understanding of the dimensions, dynamics and range of factors at play on the matter of violence in democracy.
4. HISTORICAL DATABASE
4. HISTORICAL DATABASE

4.1 Analysis of Political Violence for 2000-2018

The HSRC created a historical database of Councillors and Municipal Officials’ killing, harm and threats for the period 2000 to 2018 at the request of SALGA. This section reports on the results of a media analysis of political violence for the period 2000 to 2018. The focus of this section is on the political violence that affected municipal councillors, Municipal Managers, Senior Municipal Officials as well as other local level politicians such as the youth league and party representatives. The results are obtained from the dataset that was created by analysing media reports from Sabinet and was supplemented by information derived from municipalities as well as electronic media reports.

Table 1: Political Violence for 2000-2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Assassination</th>
<th>Attempted Assassination</th>
<th>Damage to property of Councillors/officials</th>
<th>Threats</th>
<th>Injuries</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Councillor</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Manager</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Municipal Officials</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 provides an overview of the frequency of incidents captured by the database where Councillors (all categories of municipal Councillors), Municipal Managers and Senior Municipal Officials were affected by political violence for the period 2000 to 2018. This particular table also captures incidents of assassinations, attempted assassinations, damage to property of the different categories of officials as well as threats made to the life and property of individuals. What immediately stands out is the shockingly high number (89) of Councillors who were assassinated over this period. The media also reported twelve assassination attempts of Councillors.

Comparably, Municipal Managers and Senior Municipal Officials were significantly less affected by political violence but did not stay untouched. Two Municipal Managers and two Senior Municipal Officials were assassinated over the period under discussion.

Councillors were significantly affected by threats to their lives (31) as well as incidents of damage to their property (29). Political violence also led to injuries of 25 Councillors. Overall, Councillors were by far the most affected by political violence with a total number of 186 cases reported in the media of which the majority of cases constituted assassinations.
Figure 1 presents an overview of the spread of cases of political violence over the period of 2000-2018. From this graph, two years stand out as the most violent years for this period. The years 2012, 2016 and 2017 show peaks in overall violence against Councillors, officials and other local level political role players. Assassination figures of 22 (2016) and 19 (2017) constitute the majority of cases of political violence for these two years. During these two years, Councillors and officials also had to contend with significant damage to their property, with seven cases in 2016 and 8 in 2017. During the period under review, these numbers were exceeded only in 2012, when nine cases were reported.

A high number of Councillors also sustained personal injuries during the years 2014 (7) and 2018 (7). Other years where significant injuries were recorded were 2016 (4) and 2017 (4).

Over time, the media also reported on numerous threats made against political Councillors. Years which stood out for this type of violence were 2012(13), 2017(4) and 2018(4).

There is a strong correlation between peaks in political assassinations, attempted assassinations and election years, as is reflected by Figure 2.
Figure 2: Assassination and attempts in election years

The graph indicates years when national/provincial and municipal elections were held. Municipal elections in particular, correlate very closely with peaks in assassinations and attempts from 2005 to 2018. Municipal elections in 2011 (9) and 2016 (24) bears very significant spikes in the number of assassinations and attempted assassinations. Also, very significant is the trend in the year, which follows municipal elections, which is particularly violent when looking at the number of incidences of assassinations and assassination attempts.

The years of national elections were less significant for the number of assassinations and attempts, with 2009 the only possible exception where seven cases were reported.

Map 2: Provincial Dimension of Political Violence
The map shown (Map 2) provides an overview of all types of political violence, which include assassinations, attempted assassinations, damage to Councillors’ property, threats and injuries to Councillors for the period of 2000 to 2018. KwaZulu-Natal province stands out as the province (88 cases) where Councillors are particularly under siege due to political violence. Other provinces which also experienced a significant number of incidents are the Western Cape (30 cases), Gauteng (23 cases) and Mpumalanga (22). Remaining provinces all had less than 20 incidents recorded by the media over this period. The Northern Cape was the least affected by incidents of political violence with only four cases recorded.

Figure 3 below provides more information on the type of violence, which dominated in different provinces. The graph reveals that KwaZulu-Natal suffered from more political assassinations (68) than all other provinces combined. Other provinces, which also had a significant number of assassinations, were Gauteng (8), Western Cape (7) as well as Mpumalanga (6). The Free State and Northern Cape were the least affected by political assassinations with a count of one and two respectively. Several unsuccessful assassination attempts on the lives on politicians were also recorded, with KwaZulu-Natal again standing out with nine documented cases. Interestingly, damage to property of politicians did not feature as prominently in KwaZulu-Natal but dominated in Mpumalanga (13 cases), Gauteng (12 cases) and the Free State (10 cases).

Figure 3: Political violence per province

Political violence has led to injuries of a number of politicians over time. Those residing in North West (seven incidents) and Western Cape (six incidence) provinces have been the worst affected. No incidences were reported in Gauteng and the Northern Cape.

The Western Cape (16 cases) had by far the most reports of violent threats against local level politicians followed by KwaZulu-Natal (eight cases). Free State and Mpumalanga did not report any cases of violent threats for the period 2000-2018 in the media.
Municipal Councillors have been the worst affected by political assassinations. Figure 4 provides a percentage breakdown of assassinations of Councillors per province. The total number (N) of assassinations of Councillors for the period under discussion is 89. From the chart it is clear that KwaZulu Natal has been worst affected by a large margin, at 63% of all assassinations for the period 2000-2018. Gauteng province is located in the second spot with 9%, closely followed by the Western Cape at 8%. The Northern Cape and North West provinces have been the least affected with percentages of two and three percent respectively. The overall picture painted by this graph is that the assassinations of Councillors is a problem that touches all provinces but is mainly KwaZulu-Natal by a very large margin.

Figure 4: Assassinations of Councillors per province

A more detailed spatial analysis of political violence at district and metro level provides some interesting insights, which portrays the top 10 areas with the worst levels of political violence (Fig 5).

Figure 5: Political violence per municipality
Overall, Ethekwini Metro featured as the area worst affected by political violence (19 incidents) over the period under discussion. Next most affected were the City of Cape Town (18 incidents) and Umgungundlovu (15 incidents). Municipalities, which were particularly hard hit by assassinations, were Ethekwini Metro (13), Umgungundlovu District (10), Umzinyathi District (8) as well as the Ugu District (8). Attempted assassinations featured the most in Ethekweni (3) as well as Harry Gwala District (3). Cape Town (10) featured as the area with the highest number of reported threats. Interestingly, Sedibeng (10) featured on the list due to the high number of incidents of damage to property recorded.

4.2 Discussion and Findings

One of the main findings of this research is the disturbingly high number of 89 Councillors who were assassinated over the period 2000 to 2018. These assassinations have increased over time, peaking in 2016/17. In addition, twelve attempted assassinations of Councillors were recorded in our media analysis. There is a very high correlation between peaks in political assassinations, attempted assassinations and years when local elections take place. The year, which follows municipal elections, is usually also particularly violent. Comparably, Municipal Managers and Senior Municipal Officials were significantly less affected by political violence but did not stay untouched. Two Municipal Managers and two Senior Municipal Officials were assassinated during the period under discussion.

KwaZulu-Natal Province stands out as the province where Councillors are particularly under siege due to political violence. The overall picture painted is that the assassination of Councillors is a problem that touches all provinces, but most particularly KwaZulu-Natal. At local government level, Ethekwini Metropolitan Municipality featured as the area worst affected by political violence with the highest number of assassinations and attempted assassinations.

Political violence has led to injuries of a number of politicians over time. Those residing in North West and Western Cape provinces have been the worst affected by this type of violence. The Western Cape had the highest frequency of reports of violent threats against local level politicians, followed by KwaZulu-Natal in second place. Interestingly, damage to property of politicians did not feature as prominently in KwaZulu-Natal as in Mpumalanga, Gauteng and the Free State.
5. THE SOUTH AFRICAN SPECIAL RISK INSURANCE AGENCY DATABASE
5. THE SOUTH AFRICAN SPECIAL RISK INSURANCE AGENCY DATABASE

5.1 Analysis of SASRIA Database for the Period 2013-2018

Over time, SALGA has embarked on various initiatives to support its members. One of these initiatives is arrangements in 2012 for the application of SASRIA in support of indemnifying Councillors and mayors against the loss of their property caused by civil commotion, public disorder, strikes, riots and terrorism (SALGA, 2016:27). SASRIA SOC Ltd is the only short-term insurer that provides special risk cover to government entities against civil insurrection. Municipalities are entitled to activate this support by including the houses of Councillors and mayors as part of their premium contributions and policy cover (SALGA, 2016:27). Generally, SASRIA provides insurance cover to subscribed municipalities against riots, strikes, terrorism, civil commotion and public disorder (SALGA, 2016:27). Noteworthy is the fact that not all municipalities have subscribed to this type of cover, which implies that the monetary value of damage to property, as indicated in this report, is not representative of all municipalities and may most probably be higher.

The terms for this cover can be summarised as follows (SASRIA, 2019):

- Municipalities can include cover for mayors and Councillors’ houses and vehicles under their own fire policy;
- Houses of municipal mayors and councilors can be insured for values of up to a limit of R1.5m (homeowners and householders combined) (VAT inclusive) for a premium of R5.45 per month or R54.47 per annum;
- The municipality need to make a declaration to the underlying insurer at inception on the total number of Councillors;
- A separate coupon needs to be issued in respect of houses included;
- A separate underlying policy is required for cover in excess of R1.5m;
- Household contents are included in the cover but are capped at not more than 30% of the value of the property and cannot exceed the limit of R1.5m (combined);
- Only mayors and Councillors are eligible for this insurance cover, which is synchronised with the duration of their term of office.

It is important to note that this coverage did not extend to Municipal Managers and did not indemnify the lives of Councillors and mayors against hospitalisation or death because of civil insurrection (SALGA, 2016:27).

SASRIA provided claims data for analysis to assess the nature of damage to municipal property due to political riots for the period 2013 to 2018. The dataset included “peril’s” which comprised of political riot, non-political riot and strike related damage and claims which were paid out for the period under review. As such, the discussion in this narrative includes all aspects of the dataset but with an emphasis on damage caused by political riots.
Figure 6: Proportional Analysis of Peril Claims

Figure 6 represents a proportional distribution of the value of claims per peril group, which include non-political riot claims, political riot claims and strike related claims. From this chart, it is evident that the majority of claims for the period 2013-2018 were due to non-political riot related events at 65%. Interestingly, political riot claims comprised only 16% of the total value of claims with strike related claims coming in marginally higher at 19% of all claims for the period under review.

Figure 7: Peril by year
Figure 7 presents an analysis of perils for the time period 2013 to 2018 and reflects a general increase in perils of a non-political nature. Political riot related claims stayed consistent for the period 2013 to 2015 with 35, 34 and 39 claims made respectively. Interestingly, there is an abrupt reduction in political riot claims for the period 2016-2018 but a significant increase in non-political claims. Strike related claims also reduced significantly for the period 2016 to 2018.

The graph in figure 8 provides an overview of the history of claims for the period 2013-2018. It is evident from the graph that political riot related claims were at its highest in 2014 at R37 million and became significant less for the period 2015-2017. The 2018 figure for political riot claims were negligible which stood at R350 000. Non-political riot in contrast showed a general trend of increases and peaked in 2018 at R100 million. Strike related claims trended lower from 2013 to 2016 but increased significantly for the year 2017.

**Figure 8: Value of Peril Claims for 2013-2018**
Table 2: Rand Value of Damage per Peril

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Peril</th>
<th>Grand Total in Rands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Service Delivery (Non-political riot)</td>
<td>164 527 399.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Delivery (Political riot)</td>
<td>56 568 545.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strike (Non-Unions related)</td>
<td>47 617 008.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riot Isolated Event (Non-political riot)</td>
<td>40 401 095.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damage to Property (Non-political riot)</td>
<td>25 602 719.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unions (Strike related riot)</td>
<td>11 654 216.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damaged property (Strike related riot)</td>
<td>10 760 781.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxi violence (Non-political riot)</td>
<td>10 155 205.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Demand (Non-political riot)</td>
<td>7 775 796.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Strike (Strike related riot)</td>
<td>4 765 913.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections (Political riot)</td>
<td>3 791 649.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire damage (Non-political riot)</td>
<td>2 825 623.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target of Office Bearer (Non-political riot)</td>
<td>1 695 763.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle stoned (Strike related riot)</td>
<td>1 400 057.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle Burnt (Strike related riot)</td>
<td>483 709.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle set alight (Non-political riot)</td>
<td>459 916.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riot - Political Objective (Political riot)</td>
<td>360 890.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle stoned (Non-political riot)</td>
<td>209 823.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riot related violence (Non-political riot)</td>
<td>179 085.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student riots (Non-political)</td>
<td>170 898.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target of Office Bearer (political riot)</td>
<td>157 109.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riot - Power Cuts (Non-political riot)</td>
<td>54 565.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political celebrations (Political riot)</td>
<td>28 564.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilferage (Non-political riot)</td>
<td>28 028.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House set alight (Non-political riot)</td>
<td>14 877.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miners (Strike related riot)</td>
<td>7 234.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malicious Damage (Non-political riot)</td>
<td>6 292.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bus damage (Non-political riot)</td>
<td>4 050.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest against discrimination (Non-political riot)</td>
<td>1 565.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>391 708 384.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 captures the rand value of damage of the six-year period. The total damage pay out for the period 2013-2018 was valued at R392 million (rounded). Of this amount, service delivery (combined) related incidents were by far the most expensive and contributed to just more than R221 million of damage payouts. However, service delivery riots of a political nature only totaled R57 million. Other political related incidents included damage related to elections (R3.8 million), riots with a political objective (R361 000), political celebrations (R29 000) and targeting of office bearers (R157 000). The grand total for all political related damage for the period under review was R61 million (rounded).
Figure 9: Frequency of Claims per Municipality (Top 10)

The top ten municipalities with the highest frequency of claims are shown in Figure 9. The table also provides an overview of the year in which claims were made. Of the top ten municipalities, five were metros, namely Ekurhuleni, Buffalo City, Nelson Mandela Bay, Ethekwini and Tshwane. Ekurhuleni submitted more claims (67) than any other municipality, followed by Buffalo City (34) and Nelson Mandela Bay (31). For the period 2013 to 2018, the year 2018 stands out owing to the particularly high number of claims by four of the top ten municipalities.

Table 3: Top Twenty Highest ‘Total Claim’ Municipalities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rand Value Category</th>
<th>Municipality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&gt; R20 million</td>
<td>Mangaung Municipality, Govan Mbeki Municipality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R10 - R20 million</td>
<td>Overstrand Municipality, Sundays River Municipality, Rand West City Local Municipal, Great Kei Municipality, Emakhazeni Local Municipality, George Municipality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3 provides an overview of the top twenty municipalities with the highest rand claim value. The municipalities with claims in excess of R20 million were Mangaung Metro and Govan Mbeki municipality. Of the remaining municipalities, six had claims ranging between R10-20 million with the rest (12) having claims of lower than R10 million. The highest claim did not exceed R50 million while the lowest claim was more than R5 million.

5.2 Discussion and Findings

For the period 2014 to 2018, the value of political riot-related claims consistently reduced from year to year and comprised 16% of total claims. During the period, 2013 to 2018 there was a general increase in non-political claims while the value of strike-related claims reduced for the period 2013 to 2018. However, 2017 marked a significant exception to the general trend of lower strike related claims. The total damage pay out for all types of political related incidents for the period 2013-2018 was valued at R61 million (rounded). Of this amount, service delivery (political) related incidents were by far the most expensive and contributed to R57 million of damage payouts. Other political related incidents were less significant but included damage due to political elections (R3.8 million), riots with a political objective (R361 000), political celebrations (R29 000) and targeting of office bearers (R157 000).

Of the top ten municipalities with the highest frequency of claims, five were metros, namely Ekurhuleni, Buffalo City, Nelson Mandela Bay, Ethekwini and Tshwane. The top ten highest claims (total) for municipalities ranged from R5 million to R50 million. Mangaung and Govan Mbeki municipalities had the highest overall claims which exceeded R20 million but not R50 million.
6. **SURVEY OF EXPERIENCES OF HARM OR THREATS OF VIOLENCE AMONG LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILLORS, WARD COMMITTEE MEMBERS, MUNICIPAL MANAGERS AND SENIOR OFFICIALS**
6. SURVEY OF EXPERIENCES OF HARM OR THREATS OF VIOLENCE AMONG LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILLORS, WARD COMMITTEE MEMBERS, MUNICIPAL MANAGERS AND SENIOR OFFICIALS

6.1 Characteristics of Respondents

More than half (57.8%) of the 387 respondents to the SALGA-HSRC survey were local government Councillors and about one-quarter (24.8%) were Municipal Officials. The rest were Members of Ward Committees (9.8%), Municipal Managers (3.1%) or unspecified (4.5%). Geographical distribution was across the country, with the largest numbers of responses from Gauteng (20.1%), Eastern Cape (19.9%) and the Western Cape (15.2%). The ratio of females to males from whom responses were received was approximately 40:60.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>Councillor</th>
<th>Manager</th>
<th>Official</th>
<th>Ward Committee</th>
<th>Unspecified</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female Male</td>
<td>Female Male</td>
<td>Female Male</td>
<td>Female Male</td>
<td>Female Male</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>28 35</td>
<td>0 1</td>
<td>2 6</td>
<td>0 1</td>
<td>1 0</td>
<td>31 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>3 12</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>2 3</td>
<td>8 7</td>
<td>1 0</td>
<td>15 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>15 28</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>10 7</td>
<td>6 6</td>
<td>1 3</td>
<td>32 44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>11 10</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>3 8</td>
<td>0 1</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>15 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>2 12</td>
<td>1 0</td>
<td>6 10</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>9 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>7 9</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>7 4</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>3 2</td>
<td>17 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>2 6</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>0 1</td>
<td>0 2</td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>3 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>14 9</td>
<td>0 1</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>14 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>11 15</td>
<td>1 5</td>
<td>7 12</td>
<td>3 4</td>
<td>2 3</td>
<td>24 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>93 136</td>
<td>4 9</td>
<td>37 51</td>
<td>17 21</td>
<td>9 10</td>
<td>160 227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender ratio</td>
<td>40.6 59.4</td>
<td>30.8 69.2</td>
<td>42.0 58.0</td>
<td>44.7 55.3</td>
<td>47.4 52.6</td>
<td>41.3 58.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: An additional 61 respondents did not specify their occupational category, or gender or provincial location. These are excluded from the above table.

Whereas the differences in distribution of respondents by gender across the provinces was not statistically significant, the distribution of respondent categories was significantly different across the provinces ($X^2=171,427; \ df=36; \ sig. =0.000$), with disproportionate representation of Councillors (>80%) among the respondents in North West and Eastern Cape. The respondents were also distributed across all three municipality types, although predominantly local municipalities (63, 7%), with smaller proportions from metropolitan municipalities (25, 0%) and district municipalities (11, 3%). Those in metropolitan municipalities were predominantly in Gauteng or the Eastern Cape. Respondents were mainly aged over 50 years (39.9%) or between 41 and 50 years (33.4%), and almost half (42.9%) had worked in their positions for less than six years, while only 7.4% had served for more than 20 years in local government.
6.2 Experience of Threat or Harm

A large proportion (69%) of those who responded to the survey indicated that they had been exposed to some sort of violence or threat related to their work in local government. This is arguably to be expected. We speculate that such respondents would have been more easily able to relate to research about such exposure and would want to share information about it anonymously, especially given the lack of support or assistance that they had received after the event, as emerges in other questions in the research instrument.
There were statistically significant differences in exposure to violence or threat, between the various categories of respondent and their demographics. Firstly, the Municipal Managers, local government Councillors and those who did not specify their categories were significantly more likely to have been exposed to violence or threat than were Municipal Officials or Members of Ward Committees ($X^2 = 18,366; df=4; sig.=0.001$). Secondly, respondents based in metropolitan municipalities were far more likely than those in local municipalities to have been exposed to the violence or threat, and somewhat more so than those in district municipalities ($X^2 = 14,762; df=2; sig. =0.001$).

**Table 7: Exposure to violence or threat by respondent province and gender**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Gender</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FS</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KZN</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NW</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WC</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FS</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KZN</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NW</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WC</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>($X^2 = 25,528 ; df=9 ; sig.=0.002$)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Across the nine provinces, there is a statistically significant difference ($\chi^2=22,107; \text{df}=8; \text{sig.}=0.005$) in exposure to violence or threat between provinces. Respondents based in Northern Cape (86%), North West (80%), Gauteng (80%) and KwaZulu-Natal (77%) are proportionately more likely than those in other provinces to have reported being exposed to violence or threat. By gender, males (75%) were more likely than females (67%) to have reported having such exposure.

### Table 8 Exposure to violence or threat by respondent age group and duration of service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group (years old)</th>
<th>Duration of service (years)</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Significance</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20-30</td>
<td>&lt;6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>$\chi^2=1,572; \text{df}=3; \text{sig.}=0.666$</td>
<td>$\chi^2=2,926; \text{df}=3; \text{sig.}=0.403$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>6-10</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>11-20</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51+</td>
<td>21+</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The survey data reveal that exposure to violence or threat has not occurred significantly differently between the age groups of the respondents, or the length of their service in the local government sector.

### 6.3 Types of Threat or Violence

As indicated in the previous section, Councillors, Ward Committee Members, Senior Municipal Officials and Municipal Managers were asked whether they have been exposed to any sort of violence or threats while in office. Results from the survey reveal that 69% reported having been exposed to violence or threats while only 31% indicated that they have never been exposed to any form of violence or threats. The most frequent harm to which our respondents have been exposed is a threat (56, 4%). About one in ten indicated that they had experienced physical harm (11, 1%), or a threat as well as damage to their property (including cars and homes) (10, 7%); or damage to property (9, 1%). A smaller proportion reported both a threat and physical harm (6, 8%); and 2, 9% indicated that they have experience other forms of harm. A few (2, 9%) respondents did not answer the question.

![Figure 12: Type of threat or harm experienced](image-url)
As shown in the Figure 13 below, slightly fewer respondents (37, 8%) indicated that there had been early signs of possible violence, than those who indicated there were no signs (39, 7%). More than a fifth (22, 5%) did not respond to the question.

Municipal Officials were asked to indicate against whom the violence was directed. Results from the survey reveal that 55% of Municipal Officials indicated that the violence was directed at them personally. About one in six (16%) said that the violence or threat was directed at them and their properties. Others indicated that it was directed at themselves personally as well as their relatives (7, 8%), their property (7, 8%), or at their families (4, 9%). More than half (57, 7%) said that they knew the perpetrators.

More than two-thirds of respondents indicated that they have experienced a threat or violence more than once, with 44% indicating that they have experienced threat or violence several times. About one-fifth (20, 2%) have experienced threats twice. About one-quarter (25, 4%) of respondents experienced threat or violence once, whilst 9, 8% did not respond to the question.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9 How often or frequently have you experienced a threat or violence?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Once</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Several times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Municipal Officials who have been exposed to violence or threats indicated that the main source of threats or violence was from community members (62, 5%) while 39, 4% indicated that they have experienced threats or violence from members of political parties. Smaller proportions indicated that their source of threats was from businesspersons (7, 9%) or members of trade unions (7, 8%) or all four of these sources (4, 6%) or other sources (5, 9%).
Table 10: Sources of threats experienced

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Threats</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community members</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of political parties</td>
<td>39.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of trade unions</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All of the above</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>131.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The percentage is greater than 100% because some participants gave multiple responses to the question

Results in Table 10 revealed that the majority of threats came from community members; which might be an explanation for the main perceived motivation for the threats, namely lack of service delivery (48.5%). A smaller proportion (23.8%) perceived that the motivations for violence were general criminality or municipal elections (22.1%), with 3.6% mentioning public safety as a motive, and 20.2% indicating other perceived motivations (Table 11 and Figure 14).

Table 11: Perceived motivations of the instigators or perpetrators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived Motivation</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Service delivery</td>
<td>48.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General criminality</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal elections</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public safety</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>122.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The percentage is above 100% due to participants who gave multiple responses to the question

The participants who indicated that they have been exposed to violence or threats were asked how they dealt with the threats or violence (Figure 15). A quarter (25.7%) indicated that they reported the perpetrators to the police. Others reported it to the council and to the police (22.8%), or only to the council (19.9%). About one in six (17.6%) of the respondents said that they could not deal with the issues. A small proportion (2.4%) obtained private security or took other measures (5.2%).
How did you deal with the threat or violence?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reported to council</th>
<th>19.9%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reported to the police</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reported to council and to the police</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obtained private security</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Couldn't deal with the issues</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 0% | 5% | 10% | 15% | 20% | 25% | 30% |

**Figure 15:** How did you deal with the threat or violence?

Table 12 below tabulates the extent of awareness of violence or threats made against a fellow Councillor/Ward Committee Member/Senior Municipal Official/Municipal Manager. A majority (58.9%) indicated that they are aware of violence or threats against fellow local municipal colleagues whilst 19.6% indicated that they are not aware of any violence or threats happening to their counterparts. Out of 448 respondents, 21.4% did not answer the question.

**Table 12: Awareness of violence or threats made against any fellow Councillor/Ward Committee Member/Senior Municipal Official/Municipal Manager**

| Yes | 58.9 |
| No | 19.6 |
| No response | 21.4 |
| Total | 100.0 |

Among those who indicated that they are aware of violence or threats made against their counterparts, almost half (48.9%) indicated that these threats or violence had happened several times. A small proportion indicated that the threats happened once (7.8%) or twice (6.5%) respectively. More than a third (36.8%) gave no response to the question.

**Table 13: How often were threats of violence made against a fellow Councillor/Ward Committee Member/Senior Municipal Official/Municipal Manager during the past 2 years?**

| Once | 7.8 |
| Twice | 6.5 |
| Several times | 48.9 |
| No response | 36.8 |
| Total | 100.0 |
6.4 Remedial Actions

Respondents who have experienced threats or violence were asked “What were the outcomes after you reported or took action in response to the threats?” All most half (48.9%) of respondents indicated that nothing happened after reporting the incidents. This means that either the threats or violence continued, perpetrators were not arrested; or no action took place. On the other hand, 20.5% of respondents indicated that violence stopped after reporting the incidents of threats or violence. A small portion indicated that perpetrators were arrested (6.5%), or that more violence occurred (5.2%) or that there was another form of outcome (8.5%) after their reporting of the threats. A few (7.8%) did not respond to the question.

Survey data in Figure 16 reveal that it was not easy for most respondents to deal with the loss or trauma that transpired from threats or violence. Just over a quarter (26.4%) said that it was ‘very difficult’ and about one-fifth (21.2%) said that it was ‘difficult’ to obtain formal assistance. Just over a quarter (27.0%) who were exposed to threats or violence indicated that it had been neither easy nor difficult for them to obtain formal assistance to deal with the trauma. Smaller proportions indicated that it was ‘easy’ (8.1%) or ‘very easy’ (5.2%) to get formal assistance.

**Figure 16:** Outcomes after reporting or action in response to threats

**Figure 17:** Remedial actions
It might be expected that an employer would provide remedial assistance in the event of employees experiencing trauma in the course of their work. However, the statistics from the survey (Figure 17 and Table 14 show that more than a quarter (26.7%) indicated that they were not offered any remedial action to deal with their loss or trauma. Smaller proportions indicated that they received counselling (17.6%), legal protection (10.7%), the replacement or rebuilding of their property (3.6%), hospitalisation (2.9%) or financial compensation (1%). One fifth (20.1%) were the beneficiaries of ‘other’ forms of remedial action, and 25.7% did not respond to the question.

Table 14: What type of remedial actions were you offered to deal with your loss or trauma?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Remedial Action</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Counselling</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal protection</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property rebuilt or replaced</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitalised</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial compensation</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nothing</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>108.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The percentage is above 100% due to participants who gave multiple responses to the question.

Almost half (49.5%) of respondents (Figure 17) felt that the remedial actions they were offered were not satisfactory, whilst only 21.5% indicated that they were satisfied. More than a quarter (29%) did not respond to the question.

6.5 Effects of Violence

Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree or disagree with the statement: ‘Violence and threats prevent Councillors/ Ward Committee Members/ Senior Municipal Officials/ Municipal Managers from effectively carrying out their duties’. More than half (51.1%) of respondents indicated that they strongly agree and 22.1% indicated that they agree. A small portion disagreed or strongly disagreed, whilst others were neutral or did not respond.

Table 15: Violence and threats prevent Councillors/ Ward Committee Members/ Senior Municipal Officials/ Municipal Managers from effectively carrying out their duties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>51.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral, Neither agree or disagree</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Response</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Most respondents agree with the statement that ‘violence and threats prevent Councillors from running for office again’. A large percentage (33%) indicated that they ‘strongly agree’ while 27.7% indicated that they ‘agree’ with the statement.

**Table 16: Violence and threats prevent Councillors from running for office again**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral, Neither agree</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or disagree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More than half (50.2%) strongly agree with the statement: ‘Violence or threats impact negatively on my family’, and a further 22.3% agree. Only 1.4% disagree or strongly disagree, while 5.6% were neutral on the issue and 19.6% did not provide an answer.

**Table 17: Violence or threats impact negatively on my family**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>50.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral, Neither agree</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or disagree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 18: Perceived effects of the threats or violence**
Respondents were asked to respond to the following question ‘How safe do you feel when you are doing your job as a Councillor/ Ward Committee Member/ Senior Municipal Official/Municipal Manager?’ About two-thirds (62.4%) indicated that they feel unsafe or very unsafe when doing their job, with only 37.6% feeling safe or very safe. Survey data in Table 23 below shows that there was a statistically significant difference ($X^2=58.191; df=3; \text{sig}=0.000$) between respondents who have been exposed to violence or threat, and those who have never been exposed. Respondents who have been exposed to violence or threat were more likely (79%) than others to say that they feel unsafe or very unsafe when doing the job. Conversely, most (69%) of those who have never been exposed to threats or violence indicated that they feel safe.

Table 18: Actual exposure to violence or threat by ‘How safe do you feel when you are doing your job as a Councillor/ Ward Committee Member/ Senior Municipal Official/ Municipal Manager?’ (n=375)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Safe</th>
<th>Safe</th>
<th>Unsafe</th>
<th>Very Unsafe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>$X^2=58.191; df=3; \text{sig}=0.000$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More than half (55.6%) indicated that they do not feel protected by their municipal council and only 26.3% indicated that they feel protected. Furthermore, there was a statistically significant difference ($X^2=12.032; df=1; \text{sig}=0.001$) between the responses of those who have been exposed to violence or threat and those who have never been exposed to violence. Most who have been exposed to threat or violence indicated that they do not feel protected by their municipal council.

Figure 19: Safety and protection of Councillors/ Managers/ Officials/ Ward Committees

More than three-fifths (60.3%) of respondents are not satisfied with the existing safety mechanisms in their municipality, and only 21.4% indicated that they are satisfied. A smaller portion (18.3%) did not respond to the question. Respondents who have been exposed to violence are significantly more likely to feel unsatisfied with existing safety mechanisms at their municipalities ($X^2=16.480; df=1; \text{sig}=0.000$) than those who have not had such exposure.
Table 19: Are you satisfied with the existing safety mechanisms in your municipality?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>21,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>60,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>18,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Participants were asked to respond to the following question “What do you think can be done to improve the safety of Councillors/ Ward Committee Members/ Senior Municipal Officials/ Municipal Managers?” Almost half (43, 1%) indicated that the council should improve security measures at the local municipality premises or at home. One-third of participants did not respond to the question. Others indicated that in order to improve the safety of officials, attention should be directed to root causes. In practice this would mean that municipalities need to commit to service delivery (6, 9%), to creating community awareness (3, 1%), to proper investigation and engagement (3, 8%), or to justice (4, 5%).

Table 20: What do you think can be done to improve the safety of Councillors/ Ward Committee Members/ Senior Municipal Officials/ Municipal Managers?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>43,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>4,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service delivery</td>
<td>6,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Awareness</td>
<td>3,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proper investigation/engagement</td>
<td>3,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>30,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.6 Protest Action

Participants were asked about recent protest actions, which had happened to their local municipalities. Almost one-third (32, 8%) of respondents indicated that the municipality was not notified about the protest action in accordance with the law. A smaller proportion (13, 4%) indicated that they were not sure whether the municipality was notified or not. However, 29, 7% indicated that the protest action took place in compliance with the Regulation of Gatherings Act.
Regarding the number of participants in the protests that had occurred in their municipalities, about one quarter (26.3%) of respondents estimated that there had been between 50 and 150 protesters. A further 8% said the number had been less than fifty; 14.5% indicated between 151 and 400; and 1 in 6 (17.9%) said that the number of participants in the protest had exceeded 400.

Almost half (46.9%) of our survey respondents indicated that the cause of protests was service delivery. Others mentioned economic development issues (14.5%) including job creation and low wage payments; political issues (6.3%); corruption (3.8%) or ‘other’ issues (10.5%).
Table 21: What was the issue stated as the cause of the protest?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Service delivery</td>
<td>46.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic development/issues</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political issues</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>108.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The percentage is above 100% due to participants who gave multiple responses to the question.

6.7 Summary and Conclusion of Survey Findings

The HSRC survey of the experiences of violence by Councillors, Ward Committee Members and Municipal Officials conducted on behalf of SALGA, yielded responses from 448 respondents during the period November 2018 to March 2019. The respondents comprised 58% Councillors, 25% Municipal Officials, 10% Members of Ward Committees, 3% Municipal Managers and 4% not specified. Officials from all provinces participated, with the largest proportions in Gauteng (20%), Eastern Cape (20%) and Western Cape (15%), and in a gender ratio of 41% female to 59% male participation. Almost two-thirds (64%) were based within local municipalities, 25% in metros and 11% in district municipalities. Most were aged either over 50 years (40%) or 41 to 50 years (33%) and almost half (43%) had worked in their positions for less than six years.

A large proportion (69%) of those who responded to the survey indicated that they had been exposed to some sort of violence or threat related to their work in local government. We speculate that such respondents would have been more easily able to relate to research about such exposure and would want to share information about it. Among those who responded, those most likely to have experienced a threat or violence were Councillors (76%) and respondents in metro municipalities (84%), as well as those based in the Northern Cape (86%), North West (80%), Gauteng (80%) and KwaZulu-Natal (77%). Males (75%) were somewhat were more likely than females (67%) to have reported having such exposure. The most frequent harm to which respondents reported having been exposed was a threat (56%). About one in nine (11%) had experienced physical harm; similarly, 11% had experienced a threat as well as damage to their property; 9% experienced damage to property; 7% had both threat and physical harm; and 3% experienced other forms of harm. A slightly larger proportion (40%) said that there had been no early warnings or signs of possible violence beforehand, than those who said there had been prior warnings (38%).

More than half (55%) of those who reported harm or violence indicated that it had been directed at themselves personally. A smaller proportion (16%) said the harm was directed at them as well as their property; 8% at them and their relatives; 8% at their property and 5% at their families. About two-thirds (64%) said that they had experienced a threat or violence more than once. The main sources of threats or violence were from community members (63%); members of political parties (39%), businesspersons (8%) or members of trade unions (8%), and almost three-fifths (58%) knew the perpetrators. Frustration about lack of municipal service delivery was perceived to be the main (49%) motive for the threat or violence, with other motivations being perceived as general criminality (24%), municipal elections (22%), public safety (4%) or other (20%). Just over one quarter (26%) of those who had been exposed to a threat or violence reported the matter to the police; 23% reported it to the police as well as their council, 20% only to the council, and 2% obtained private security. About one in six (18%) victims said that they could not deal with the issues. Among all respondents, 59% indicated that they were aware of violence or threats against fellow local municipal colleagues and almost half (49%) of these said that such threats or violence had occurred several times. Almost half (49%) of respondents...
indicated that nothing had happened after they had reported the incidents, while 21% said that the threats or violence had stopped, 7% said that the perpetrators were arrested, and 5% said that more violence had occurred. For more than a quarter (26%) of the victims of threat or violence, it had been ‘very difficult’ and for 21% it had been ‘difficult’ to obtain formal assistance. Conversely, only 8% said it had been ‘easy’ and 5% that it had been ‘very easy’ to get formal assistance. The assistance received took various forms, namely counselling (18%), legal protection (11%), replacement or rebuilding of property (4%), hospitalisation (3%) or financial compensation (1%). However, a substantial 27% were not offered any remedial action to deal with their loss or trauma. Unsurprisingly therefore, 50% of respondents felt that the remedial actions they were offered were not satisfactory.

Almost three-quarters (73%) were of the view that ‘Violence and threats prevent Councillors/ Ward Committee Members/ Senior Municipal Officials/ Municipal Managers from effectively carrying out their duties’ and 61% felt that ‘Violence and threats prevent Councillors from running for office again’. Similarly, 73% agreed that ‘Violence or threats impact negatively on my family’. An alarming 62% indicated that they feel unsafe or very unsafe while doing their local government jobs. This sentiment was significantly more prevalent among those who had been exposed to violence or threat (72%) than those who had not (31%). Consequently it is also no surprise that 56% of respondents do not feel protected by their municipal council, and 60% are not satisfied with the existing safety mechanisms in their municipality. In search of remedies, 43% felt that their council should improve security measures at the municipal premises or at their home. Other comments were that municipalities should address root causes by committing to service delivery (7%), to justice (5%), to proper investigation and engagement (4%); or to the creation of community awareness (3%).

Asked about recent protest actions, 30% said that the municipality had been notified and 33% that it had not been notified in compliance with the Regulation of Gatherings Act. About one sixth (18%) estimated that the number of protest participants had been in excess of 400; 15% said between 151 and 400; 26% between 50 and 150; and 8% less than 50 participants. One third did not provide an estimate. Almost half (47%) indicated that the cause of protests was service delivery; 15% attributed them to economic development issues; 6% to political issues; 4% to corruption; and 11% to other issues.
7. RICHMOND, UMGUNGUNDLOVU DISTRICT, KWAZULU-NATAL CASE STUDY
7. RICHMOND, UMGUNGUNDLOVU DISTRICT, KWAZULU-NATAL CASE STUDY

7.1 Introduction

Geographical Overview

Richmond is a small rural town located on the banks of the Illovo River in the KwaZulu-Natal province. The town is located in the Midlands on the R56 route, 38km to the south-west of the provincial capital of Pietermaritzburg. The town of Richmond and the former Ndaleni Township are at the centre of the Richmond Local Municipality. The municipality is a category B municipality and the fourth smallest of seven local municipalities that comprises the larger uMgungundlovu District Municipality (Richmond, 2018a).

Richmond covers an area of approximately 1232 square kilometres and has an estimated population of 71 322 individuals living in 17 570 households (Richmond, 2018a). Most residents in the Richmond municipal area live in a rural environment. The rural areas are characterised by low levels of service delivery with few facilities and high levels of unemployment. Richmond town is the only recognised urban centre and economic node in the area. Government and municipal services provided in Richmond are typically related to the Magistrate’s Court, clinic, pension pay point, health, education and welfare office. Land uses within the Richmond town area are mixed urban with limited infrastructural and services development but a relatively good coverage of social facilities and services to support town residents (Richmond, 2009).

The Integrated Development Plan (2015) report for Richmond draws attention to socio-economic challenges in the area such as an increase in the rate of unemployment, higher poverty and a decrease in investment. The report also proclaims that the municipality lacks the resources required to meet the growing demand for service delivery to poor, excluded and vulnerable sections of the population.

Structure of the Richmond Municipality

Richmond municipality is divided into seven wards (See Map 3). Each of the seven wards has Ward Councillors who represents various constituencies.

The municipality comprises of four departments: corporate services, financial services, technical services and community services. The annual municipal budget for Richmond for the 2018/19 financial year is R103 million of which R80 million comprises a subsidy from national government. Employee related costs comprise 39% of the budget and Councillors account for 5% of the budget spent. The municipality is legislated to have a full-time mayor, full-time speaker, full-time deputy mayor, part time member of the executive council as well as Councillors (Richmond, 2018b).
Political Violence and Corruption in Richmond

Political killings and corruption in Richmond had a major impact on the structure and functioning of the municipality over the years. This is embedded in history due to a period of intense conflict and political violence from 1989 to 2000 (Nebandla, 2005:1). Despite the fact that political stability came to the region from 2000 onwards, Richmond town and the surrounding areas have continued to grapple with a violent culture that became a marked legacy of this conflict (Nebandla, 2005:1). Nebandla (2005: 5) reports that this legacy not only affected the lives of people living in the area, but also decimated the economy of Richmond.

The historical conflict between various political parties left more than 120 people dead in the area, and had socio-economic legacies that became ingrained in society. These include mistrust between people, trauma and post-traumatic stress due to extreme violence, economic destruction, uncontrolled circulation of firearms, lack of trust and faith in the justice system that for many years added to the conflict, and groups of trained Self Protection and Defence Units whose members were never demobilised after the advent of democracy (Nebandla, 2005: 5).

The conflict in Richmond embodied to many all the elements for a perfect storm, which instigated and perpetuated violence and conflict in KwaZulu-Natal. Currently, Richmond still bears the scars of recent killings of two politicians and the municipal manager.

The year 2017 was marked as a particularly violent year in the history of Richmond. During this time period, the town’s deputy mayor, Thankazile Phoswa was shot and killed at her home in Ndaleni. Both ward councillor Sifiso Mkhize and the municipal manager, Sibusiso Edward Sithole lost their lives in a hail of bullets during two different incidents (Singh, 2017).
The Moerane Commission of inquiry was tasked with investigating political killings in KwaZulu-Natal in 2017. During testimony, it was said that in Richmond there was “a climate of fear, intimidation and killings in the municipality that had virtually seen service delivery being brought to halt” (Africa News Agency, 2018). Furthermore, it was testified that corruption and severe budget cuts in the municipality has severely compromised service delivery in the town. It was also said that the former municipal manager had strong anti-corruption views, which made him very unpopular at the municipality and led to the executive not wanting to extend his contract (Africa News Agency, 2018).

The Richmond malaise continued in 2018 with the CFO of the municipality, Mr. Sanjay Mewelall being arrested in December and having his luxury house in Northdale and 16 vehicles seized by the Asset Forfeiture Unit. It was reported that assets valued at almost R1.5 million were accumulated by the former CFO when he defrauded the municipality of almost R2 million (CFO South Africa, 2018).

In March 2019 the KwaZulu-Natal Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) placed the Richmond municipality under administration. Accordingly, the executive function of the municipality was to be handled by the provincial government. COGTA ascribed its involvement in the municipality to political and administrative instability, and alleged maladministration and corruption against senior Municipal Managers all of which impact negatively on service delivery (KwaZulu-Natal COGTA, 21 March 2019).

The culture of violence and corruption legacy is not unique to Richmond. It reflects similar problems, which have been experienced in other parts of the province where high levels of political intolerance and violence are the norm. However, the inter-party animosity, which marked the advent of democracy until the early 2000s, made way for a different type of violence, which now became intra-party. Rivalry and competition among current and aspirant Councillors in dominant parties have played out against a background of personal influence and power, distrust, high levels of unemployment, limited resources, poor service delivery and corruption.

### 7.2 Reasons for Political Killings

Respondents in the Richmond municipality provided various reasons they believed were behind political violence in the area. Some of the key reasons include the following:

Firstly, the issue of contestation of power within political structures or parties, what is often termed intra-party politics, i.e. within a political party. Various respondents outlined that within party structures there is fierce competition and jostling for positions because of the opportunity, it provides to increase their access to resources and further their business interests. For example, respondent two pointed out those certain political leaders are involved in intra-party rivalry. This contestation for power begins in the wards as he noted, “where there is competition, there is danger”.
Respondent two also pointed out “ward councilors have power and may be a threat to other office bearers such as mayors, for example, and that those deployed may feel threatened when contested”. Ward Councillors represent various constituents and can pose notable threats to mayors or other office bearers. They can bring undue pressure to influence certain outcomes to their favour, failing which if the mayor does not yield to these pressures they may galvanise other Ward Councillors to remove the mayor. The threat also emanates from Ward Councillors who may compete for the position of mayor. Should the dominant party feel the need for a change with the support of the caucus, a ward councillor may be nominated for the position of mayor. Other respondents also rated the contestation within political parties as an important cause for political violence or killings. Respondent three, for example, highlighted the fact that contestation within the institution or the municipality is a reason for political violence and respondents 7 and 8 highlighted that the reason for political killings was “fighting for positions”.

Secondly, a key issue raised in relation to political violence at the Richmond municipality relates to the tendering system for securing services, infrastructure and goods. Respondent two for example pointed out that offices of senior politicians may “influence the outcome of tenders”. The undue influence is such that tenders may be awarded to close friends or relatives from whom they may benefit. Furthermore, during the process of awarding tenders they may be paid bribes by contractors to award tenders in their favour. According to respondents, seven and eight an increase in the “corrupt awarding of tenders” was one of the main reasons behind political violence and killings. Respondent three also highlighted competing business interests in the tendering system as a reason for political violence as various business people compete against influential politicians for tenders. Those who did not win a tender may resort to violence to dislodge winning bidders. Respondent five pointed out that senior managers are involved in the adjudication of tenders and often base their decision on where they can benefit the most. This again speaks to corruption and undue influence by senior officials and politicians who may use their influence during the award of tenders for reaping personal benefits.

Thirdly, another reason for political violence was a general lack of job opportunities in the Richmond municipal area. Consequently, being a councillor implies that prospective candidates will gain employment and earn a good salary. In respondent 10’s words, “due to a lack of job opportunities people wanted to be paid as a councillor”. Competing candidates may therefore resort to any means, which include violence, to achieve the goal of becoming a councillor.

Fourthly, both the lack of development and service delivery was raised as reasons for political violence. For example, if there is a lack of development or service delivery within a community, Ward Councillors often withstand the worst of community frustration. This may take the form of harm or damage to the property of Ward Councillors whom they feel are responsible for their woes. Respondent 11 attributed this type of political violence and conflict to the “misuse of money” which leads to the community’s dissatisfaction with service delivery in Richmond.

### 7.3 Unpacking Acts of Violence/Threats/Intimidation

In this section, we discuss the respondents’ perceptions on the categories of people targeted for acts of political violence (including threats and intimidation) in Richmond, the type of violence, early warnings of possible violence, and the identity of the perpetrators.
The respondents indicated that political violence in the Richmond municipal area is mostly directed towards politicians (Ward Councillors) in the municipality. Some of the reasons for politicians being mostly targeted are that “they have executive powers which may influence the council when making decisions” (Respondent 3) and “political violence is directed to the Councillors, politicians, the leaders of society at large, since those people are handling resources.” (Respondent 7). Indeed, in the recent past, two Councillors in the Richmond municipality, including the deputy mayor, were killed (Respondent 6). Senior Municipal Managers, specifically the chief financial officer, the municipal manager and the technical service manager, are also at risk of political violence since they are involved in the adjudication of tenders. Although the perception exists that ward committee members are not at risk to political violence, “since they do not have executive powers which may influence the council when taking decisions and are only a supporting structure for the council” (Respondent 3), ward committee members indicated that they are also victims of political violence. For example, a respondent noted that since ward committee members are sometimes not informed about the appointment of new staff in vacant municipal positions they cannot communicate it timeously to the community. This causes dissatisfaction among community members and sometimes results in ward committee members being threatened (Respondent 4).

The interviews revealed that threats are commonly used by people to influence, intimate and scare Ward Councillors, senior municipal management and to a lesser extent ward committee members. In some instances, respondents were only threatened once, but in other cases, they were regularly threatened. For example a respondent, who was in the process of adjudicating tenders, was several times threatened telephonically by anonymous callers that he would be killed if a tender is not awarded to a specific bidder (Respondent 1). Another respondent uncovered corruption and tabled the report at a Municipal Council Meeting after which he received several anonymous phone calls threatening him. One such caller was saying: “Why don’t you do the right thing and just go home, because I was tasked to assassinate you but I see no reason to do that. I felt that I must speak nicely to you because you are a good man” (Respondent 5). The same respondent mentioned that he realised that he might be at risk for uncovering the corruption: “I did suspect that I may be in trouble as I revealed information that no one was aware of, not even the council. Nobody knew exactly what transpired until I came in. I know that doing this report will backfire and eventually it did happen”.

Some of the respondents reported that they were often subject to death threats due to “political dynamics” in the Richmond municipal area, among others, competition for political positions in the Richmond municipal area and that “some Municipal Officials have more power than politicians” (Respondents 2, 7, 8).

One of the respondents differentiated between direct and indirect threats. A direct threat may be made personally or over the phone while an indirect threat is “where a person informed you about a threat made against you by a third party.” (Respondent 3).

Although none of the respondents reported that they were psychically attacked or their property destroyed, they were aware of damage to property of other politicians and Senior Municipal Officials during previous service delivery protests.

A respondent noted that due to intra-party political rivalry his house was raided by the Tactical Response Team of the South African Police Services (SAPS) on alleged charges of being in possession of an illegal firearm. He was, however, acquitted by a court of law since it was found that his political opponents had hidden the gun in his house in order to frame him for illegal possession of a firearm (Respondent 7).
On the question whether participants were warned beforehand of planned acts of political violence against them, different experiences were reported. While some respondents did not expect threats, others foresaw problems due to their involvement in politics and early warnings received. For example, a respondent explained that he is in contact with people from other areas who regularly warned him about possible dangers: “They say watch out today, don’t sleep at home because there are people who are planning this and that. So I am sleeping far away from home. Even in Pietermaritzburg I have a room that I am renting ... I make sure no-one sees me going out here, I just get a lift or a taxi and I am gone. No-one must know where you stay because they are about to attack you at your house” (Respondent 8).

Seemingly, many of the respondents were unfamiliar with the perpetrators of act of violence against them. What makes it even more difficult to know who the perpetrators are is that third parties are used to carry out acts of violence. A respondent explained this as such: “You can say you are familiar because you hear one is talking badly against you and you might say that he is the real perpetrator only to find out that they are using people who you may never know or suspect is up against you. They pay people to do these things so that they will come up clean...they are hiring hit men” (Respondent 7). However, some respondents were indeed familiar with the offenders as one noted: “I know them. Two Councillors supported the person. They were not even scared to say that.” (Respondent 5). Furthermore, a respondent mentioned that sometimes the perpetrator is known and sometimes not: “Some you would have a suspicion and some will let you know who they are. For example, you will receive a phone call and the person will threaten you, because you are blocking a payment so they have to identify themselves” (Respondent 3).

### 7.4. Impact of Political Violence on Victims

The respondents highlighted a number of impacts of political violence, for example, psychological impact, impact on their duties as politicians and officials, and distrust between politicians and Municipal Officials. The psychological impact of the violence is described as follows by respondents: “You do not have an understanding where the violence came from, you do not know what the reasons may be and you think that you may be the next victim. You constantly wondered will I wake up tomorrow” (Respondent 6); “The threats against me and the acts of violence against others have a psychological impact on me. The former municipal manager was shot in the street near the police station. So this can happen anywhere and also to me. For example, when I have to travel about 45km to rural areas to visit projects as part of my job, I may be shot at. You may never know what will happen to you” (Respondent 5). A respondent explained that the violence in the Richmond area impacted negatively on many people as they will “go down and fall, because they think there is a gun somewhere” if there is a loud noise in their immediate area (Respondent 7). A respondent who indicated that everyone who grew up in Richmond should receive counselling due to the violent history of the area supported this sentiment. His experiences of violence in the past made him “not fear death” (Respondent 2).

The respondents noted that political violence has a negative impact on their ability to carry out their duties as politicians and Municipal Officials as it restricts their freedom of movement. A respondent explained this as follows: “Councillors must always be visible and accessible to the communities. If you have received threats and you get a complaint at night, then it is difficult for you to attend to those complaints. It is difficult to attend to complaints without security or assessment of the area on how safe it is for you” (Respondent 3). Another respondent echoed this sentiment: “Threats do make it dangerous to go into certain areas. So it impedes the ability of Councillors to move around freely in communities. Councillors require bodyguards which are very rare to get” (Respondent 2). Similarly, another respondent said, “Councillors are supposed to deliver a service to the community, but due to the violence we cannot deliver because we are scared” (Respondent 8). Political violence also negatively affects the ability of Senior Municipal Officials to carry out their duties. A respondent commented in this regard: “Part of my job is to visit sites. I cannot go to sites due to possible danger and have to take someone with. So, I need to think twice whether I should visit or not. These acts of violence do not allow freedom to me to do my work properly. It is a hindrance. I’m actually scared to go there on my own” (Respondent 5).
The respondents also highlighted that the political violence in the Richmond area caused distrust between politicians and Senior Municipal Officials as “it is confusing who is fighting against who and why”, thus impacting negatively on cooperation (Respondent 7).

Seemingly, respondents believed that the Richmond municipality is not doing enough to protect them in order to counter the impact of political violence. Apparently, bodyguards are only appointed to protect senior politicians and some Senior Municipal Officials whereas bodyguards do not protect ordinary Councillors and ward committee members. A senior municipal official indeed acknowledged that protection services for politicians are limited due to budgetary constraints.

7.5 Impact of Political Violence on the Municipality

The respondents highlighted ways in which political violence affected the municipality. For example, political violence impacts negatively on effective service delivery of the Richmond municipality as some senior officials resigned due to acts of violence. The lack of capacity at senior level resulted in numerous delays in service delivery, as the vacant positions are not filled within reasonable time (Respondent 1). Furthermore, a respondent indicated that political violence impact on decision-making and the adoption of resolutions in the Municipal Council. He explained it as such: “We sometimes end up taking lighter decisions or try to run away from some resolutions. Last year it was difficult for the council to take particular positions on issues, because we felt that some of the killings were informed by things that the council tends to discuss” (Respondent3). Finally, the need for protection services due to political violence has a negative financial impact on the municipality and disrupts the lives of council members and their families.

7.6 Discussion and Findings

Political killings and corruption in Richmond had a major impact on the structure and functioning of the municipality over the years. However, the culture and legacy of violence and corruption is not unique to Richmond but also reflects on similar problems that have been experienced in other parts of the province where high levels of political intolerance and violence are the norm. However, the inter-party animosity, which marked the advent of democracy until the early 2000s, made way for a different type of violence, which now became intra-party. Rivalry and competition among current and aspirant Councillors in dominant parties have played out against a background of personal influence and power, distrust, high levels of unemployment, limited resources, poor service delivery and corruption.

One of the key findings on the causes of political violence in the Richmond municipality was that there was both intra-party contestation for power and contestation for tenders, which led to political killings. This is in line with literature on some of the reasons for political killings, which points out those poor socio-economic conditions tend to influence competition for positions as means of accessing control to social, political and economic resources (Torgler & Frey, 2013). As such, there is high contestation of political positions accompanied by violent conflicts by different factions or individuals within the same party (Torgler & Frey, 2013). Furthermore, almost all the respondents at Richmond municipality pointed out that there was contestation around tenders due to personal business interests. This is in line with research by, Bruce (2013) and De Haas (2016), who found that many political killings involve business interests.
Another key finding from the case study in the Richmond municipality was that it demonstrates the concept of political decentralisation and its implications. Political decentralisation refers to the devolution of political power to subnational actors such as Ward Councillors (Stanton, 2009). Within developing nations, the devolution of political power and state power is met by competing interests – competing for political power as well as political resources (De Haas, 2016). The competition for political positions and political resources underpins the majority of the political killings in South Africa. Some of these trends have been witnessed in the Richmond municipality.

The findings from the Richmond municipality, where most respondents pointed out that contestation within parties from different groups (intra-party) was one of the reasons for political violence, as well as issues around unemployment, demonstrate particular elements of both the relative deprivation theory and resource mobilisation theory which are used by psychologists to explain people’s behaviour/actions or motives.

According to Crosby (1976), relative deprivation describes the negative emotions experienced by individuals who feel unjustly deprived of something they desire. Resource mobilisation theory (McCarthy & Zald, 1977) on the other hand, holds that social movements emerge when economic and material resources are banded together in pursuit of a particular cause. On an individual level, the theories of frustration-aggression and relative deprivation theory can be motives for violence in the context of poverty, unemployment and inequalities. However, they do not fully explain the premeditated planned killings of specific government officials.

Hence, the theory of resource mobilisation provides deeper insights into the individual and collective motivations and rewards of the offenders in political killings. This is because the theory puts resources at the epicentre of contestation, particularly in the political landscape. In Richmond municipality, which has a violent history, it is quite evident that elements of resource mobilisation explain some of the reason for political violence and killings in the area.

The empirical research in Richmond indicated that political violence in the Richmond municipal area is mostly directed towards politicians (Ward Councillors) due to their executive powers in the municipal council including decision making regarding the awarding of tenders. Similarly, senior Municipal Managers, involved in the adjudication of tenders, are also at risk of political violence. Ward committee members are to a lesser extent victims of political violence.

The study conducted in the Richmond municipal area revealed that threats, including death threats, are commonly used to influence, intimidate and scare Ward Councillors, and senior municipal management. While some respondents did not expect any threats, others foresaw problems due to their involvement in politics and early warnings received. Many of the respondents were unfamiliar with the perpetrators of acts of violence against them especially since third parties are often used to carry out acts of violence.

The research identified various impacts of political violence on politicians and Municipal Officials in the Richmond municipal area. Notably, the political violence has a psychological impact on the victims, their families and members of the community as eloquently described by Respondent 6: “You do not have an understanding where the violence came from, you do not know what the reasons may be and you think that you may be the next victim. You constantly wondered, will I wake up tomorrow?” Political violence had a negative effect on the ability of politicians and Municipal Officials to carry out their duties as it affects their freedom of movement.
Councillors have to be accessible to communities and should move around freely, but are hesitant to do so in the light of threats that were made against them. Similarly, political violence also affects the ability of Senior Municipal Officials to carry out their duties, as they are afraid to visit sites in remote areas due to possible danger to their lives. The political violence in the Richmond area caused distrust between politicians and Senior Municipal Officials. Protection services were reported as limited with bodyguards only provided to selected senior politicians and Municipal Officials.

Political violence also affected Richmond municipality especially its detrimental effect on service delivery. Some senior officials resigned due to acts of violence in the municipality, resulting in a lack of capacity at senior level, which causes numerous delays in service delivery. In addition, political violence also affected decisive decision-making and the adoption of resolutions in the Municipal Council as the perception exists that matters discussed in the Council caused some of the killings. Finally, the need for protection services for politicians and officials has a negative impact on the municipal budget and available resources.
8. CITY OF CAPE TOWN (ATLANTIS) CASE STUDY
8. CITY OF CAPE TOWN (ATLANTIS) CASE STUDY

8.1. Introduction

Geographical Overview

The City of Cape Town is located on South Africa’s South Western coast, on a peninsula marked by the famous landmark, Table Mountain. Cape Town metro is regarded as one of the most multicultural cities in the world, reflecting its role as a major destination for immigrants and expatriates to South Africa (World Population Review, 2019).

The city is a category A metro and was formed after the amalgamation of seven former municipalities into one ‘Unicity’ in 2000 and covers approximately 2461 square kilometres. Services are provided to a fast growing population which numbers 4 004 793 people living in 1 264 849 households (City of Cape Town, 2017).

Cape Town is the largest contributor to the Western Cape region’s economy, which is dominated by established financial and business services sectors, followed by manufacturing. Although better off economically than most other areas in South Africa, some matters of concern were raised by households in the Community Survey of 2016. These include escalations in violence and crime, the increased cost of electricity, a lack of employment opportunities, inadequate housing, and drug abuse (City of Cape Town, 2017).

Other challenges experienced by the metro include constantly expanding informal settlements and higher numbers of households living in backyard structures, among others. The pace of service delivery demands made by these fast growing areas was also identified as particularly challenging (City of Cape Town, 2017).

Atlantis is one of the numerous suburbs and areas, which fall under the City of Cape Town. This area was identified as suitable for inclusion as a case study due to the occurrence of political violence in the area. The area is located in the northern region of the Cape Town metro and was established during the 1970s under the Group Areas Act as an industrial centre with a focus on creating employment for the coloured population (Deloitte, 2014). However, industrial development in the area took a turn for the worse when subsidies and special incentives were withdrawn from the mid-1980s onwards. Atlantis has therefore been viewed as Cape Town’s forgotten community with high unemployment figures and very little access to opportunities (Deloitte, 2014). However, the new declaration of the area as a special economic zone (SEZ) in 2018 was set to change this scenario.
The City of Cape Town employs over 26,000 staff and has an annual budget of R30.289 million which includes a capital budget of R5.927 million and an operating budget of R24.362 million (City of Cape Town, 2017).

A 231-member city council governs the metro and is elected through a system of mixed-member proportional representation (IEC, 2016). The metro is divided into 116 wards, each of which elects a councillor by first-past-the-post voting. The remaining 115 Councillors are elected from party lists so that the total number of Councillors for each party is proportional to the number of votes received by that party. Atlantis falls in ward 32 of the metro and is represented by a member of the Democratic Alliance Party (City of Cape Town, 2019).

8.2 The Dangers Inherent to Local Government Politics

The first salient theme from the interviews was the inherent dangers in being a local government official. These dangers become especially acute when one is independent of thought, and when one’s decisions and actions are based entirely on one’s commitment to the pursuit of social justice.

*It’s in your blood. Now I fight for the underprivileged, I will always. And that is why I don’t fit in easily. You see, people some want followers, not somebody that is independent...Like now, they forcing me I must decide on that people. The people must decide for themselves. I said okay I will ma go ... I won’t say to people, people must take the contractors to complete the job.* (Female Ward Councillor)

Contrary to what many people think, being a ward councillor is not a fancy job. Rather, the interviewee regards being a ward councillor as the most difficult and dangerous political job. This is because they do not sit in parliament where they are potentially removed from the realities of their constituencies. Rather, Ward Councillors interface directly with the communities, where they tend to be blamed for service delivery and other issues that local communities have, and as a result, bear the brunt of the anger and frustration of local communities.

*Ja so Councillors is nie a popular job nie (so Councillors are not a popular job). Baie mense dink [die werk] is cool en is kwaai maar dit is die laagste league van government (many people think the job is cool but it is the lowest league or rank in government). Ma ek voel nogal [dit] is die swaarste werk en nou het jy die minste betaal (I feel it is the most difficult job with the least salary). People who sit in parliament they have no clue what is happening. Hulle sit daar wette maak en hulle pas baie keer wette wat die mense nie eers participate in nie (they sit and make laws that people has not participated in).* (Female Ward Councillor)
Two focus group respondents mentioned that while they had not personally been subjected to threats, intimidation, physical assault, etc. they could recall that their late fathers, who had also been local government officials, had been subjected to these actions.

... yes my experience when I was a child my father was in politics involved... and he had some threats during the apartheid regime ...so we experienced it. I experienced it when I was a little child. (Respondent 2). My experience also reflect to my late father, he was also in the politics and he was also threatened at many times in many different ways. There was some stage where he was even locked up in the council office for the whole weekend. (Respondent 3)

8.3 Factors that Complicate Local Politics

A ward councilor alluded to a number of factors that complicate the work of local government officials. These include, among others, the increase in the population size in Atlantis. She attributes this to the fact that the town is almost fifty years old, which means that many people who were born in Atlantis are now parents and even grandparents.

It’s growing in numbers because you must remember Atlantis is 40, 43 years old. And for this 43 years, people children did grow... children have children and children.

(Female ward councillor)

This is exacerbated by the fact that, while population growth has had positive spin-offs in terms of development and job creation, there has also been an influx of people from outside, particularly migrants from other African countries.

...and now you have your Naggies (Nigerians), you have your Somalians, you have your every bodies coming here. Because here’s developments. And you will see, where there’s development, there’s an influx of people. (Female ward councillor)

For the interviewee, however, the main challenge is the flaws inherent in the low-cost public housing allocation process. There is a clamour for these houses, and because they are free, people exploit the process in order to make money, and not because they want to live it them. Thus, it is a common occurrence to find that once someone is allocated a house, the person would sell it, and just re-join the allocation waiting list.

And that is actually the main thing not even the jobs because they know they get RDP houses they don’t pay for it. They get it and sell it again so. (Female ward councillor)

The subversion of the allocation process means that many people that are legitimately entitled to these houses, are disadvantaged and remain on a waiting list for years. This is especially the case with people who were born in Atlantis and end up living as backyard dwellers.

Now the back yard dwellers don’t even get an opportunity, I have a database with some of my backyard dwellers. So there’s backyard dwellers and strange most of the backyard dwellers is your own children. Then people on the other side yeah we are 10 years 20 years 25 years on the list still no house and that is the truth dit vat tyd (it takes time). (Female ward councillor)
One of the focus group respondents alluded as to why these situations exist, namely because of what could be interpreted as unrealistic expectations on the part of the community.

I’m thinking maybe I want to share some of the experience that I have experienced lately with the current Councillors. I don’t know how they stand up in Atlantis currently with the climate of expectations from communities to be delivered or services delivered by your doorway.” (Respondent 1)

According to the respondent, the primary reason for the existence of these unrealistic expectations was a lack of understanding on the part of the community, about the processes and procedures that need to be followed at local government level.

...as to go through these difficulties of explaining to communities how things are getting done. But I also need to say the following communities out there doesn’t understand the processes of how government is operating.

The respondent further identifies educational campaigns as a possible way of mitigating against this lack of understanding.

And if ever if I can say that there needs to be more education unto the community side so that people could understand how processes work because...I would love to see that more emphasis and more time is spent on communities to educate us to do to bring that education in along to understand what the process of service delivery is specifically at local level thanks. (Respondent 1)

Another focus group respondent identified lack of unity among the predominantly Coloured residents of Atlantis and the lack of support that local government officials in the area enjoy as another significant factor that complicates local government politics.

KZN as well because they have different tribes and clans, you got your Xhosas, Zulus, Sothos that sort of thing and these people will stand behind their leaders no matter what, whether they are right or whether they are wrong....I can actually in fact admire them and respect them for that whereas our culture we do not have that in the nation...the only time we actually basically stand together is if we take a photo. That’s it. I’m sorry to say... (Respondent 5)

In addition to this, the respondent also points to the appointment of incompetent people to local government positions as another problem.

“...this also can be placed down to the incompetency people that do not know what they are doing on the floor, wards and different governing bodies which does their jobs for them which is basically frustrating to an individual which is knowledgeable, educated person that can actually do the job, but is not given the opportunities as well as the foresight... (Respondent 5)

This adds to the anger and frustration of the community.

...you can imagine the frustration is there, look at this person living this flashy life but this person is basically doing nothing for us and I will end with that and thank you so much. (Respondent 5)
8.4 Direct and Threats of Attack

a. Direct Violence to Person

Ward Councillors who live in the communities that they serve are most vulnerable to direct attack. The direct attacks included assault as well as being shot at, at home.

Respondent: here in front of this building...I was attacked...in the daytime. I came from the hospital... with a child that has been raped, 8 years old, in [mentions the place's name] as I was coming around here by the library...This guy was standing there, no he was stalking me he stalk me for almost 2 years...he was swearing and he was threatening and his was going to do this, but he was saying all the filthy words. (Councillor). Respondent: so I mean she [a politician] rocked up at home and this person just opened fire. (Focus group respondent)

b. Threats to Person

Threats of harm directed at both Councillors and senior Municipal Managers were reported more often than direct attack.

Respondent: and opened threat to him [supply chain management director] and the city. (Senior Municipal Manager). Respondent: my life started being threatened etc. (Senior Municipal Manager). Respondent: And he was swearing and he was threatening and his was going to do this, but he was saying all the filthy words. (Councillor). Respondent 1: We were at a meeting at one stage with the Councillor of ward AB and there was threats made to take her out and we had to intervene to calm the situation down. And I think it was rarely it was a rarely experience to understand how they also just doing a job. (Focus Group participant). Respondent 4: threats are coming from the floor because of a lot of people are uneducated. They blaming the Councillors, but the Councillors are only there to do their jobs to perform their jobs. Now, what we are doing and I wouldn’t say only some people most of us what we are doing, we are using the uneducated people to kill the education definite. (Focus Group participant)

The findings reveal that threats happened regularly and were directed at both Councillors and senior Municipal Managers. The ward committee members bore witness to the threats directed at Councillors, as they describe above.

c. Direct and Threatening Attacks to Staff

Municipal staff were also targets for direct attacks and threats of harm. The type of threats ranged from being held hostage to threats of burning of buildings.

Respondent: as such my unit and my staff have encountered situations where they have been... held hostage to particularly, but again it was due to ineffective communication and the inability of another organ of state to effectively communicate with us so... so what happened there the two communities the community had invaded a road reserve...and or occupied a road reserve and obviously they needed to get out of the road reserve because it's dangerous and its under overhead power line and things like that. Respondent: what was I saying to you yes so you know what you have, this phenomena now where people openly engage in criminal behaviour and so but that’s the only way we and I’m talking not about a level of education here or anything I’m not talking about that. I’m just saying they openly engage because they openly tell you well that’s the only time the government will respond...so let’s close down the N2...let’s stone the cars and let’s murder people.
d. Direct and Threats to Damage to Property

Both Councillors and Municipal Managers experienced direct and threats of damage to their homes and/or cars.

Respondent: The main ones that I’ve dealt with is where houses have been burnt. (Senior municipal manager). Respondent: And they showed how my door was broken down and how we had to fix it with planks opposite over the door to keep it safe. (Councillor). Respondent: I come out my car is damaged… they vandalise my car…ja langsaaan die police van [yes next to the police van]… Langsaan [next to]...current seat, driver side afgebreek. Hulle het my kar vol krappe gemaak. So my laptop was in there, my jacket was in there, the radio thingy was there [broke off by the driver’s side. They made scratches to my car]...they didn’t do anything with that. So they did not come for anything. (Councillor). Respondent: they targeted all the Councillors…and I heard they said they were going to bomb my house, they going to bomb Councillor 1’s house, they going to bomb the other people’s house. (Focus group participant, ward committee member). These experiences above illustrate the direct damage as well as threats to property.

8.5 Motivations/Reasons for Violence and Threats

The findings reveal two primary motivations for the violence. Firstly, issues of lack of service delivery seems to fuel the crowd threats to Councillors and municipal managers and staff but the more personally-directed violence and threats are grounded in power dynamics that come with being a state official, which includes access to resources, and perceived decision-making power. Social mobilisation and protests are an increasing global phenomenon.

a. Service Delivery

Participants explained that there is a lack of information on the process and protocols that effect service delivery. Schroeter, Jovanovic and Renn, (2014) state that, “Perceptions of what is legitimate political action can change, either as satisfaction with the state changes or as a growing number of citizens believe that peaceful protest or voting in elections are ineffective at raising their issues and achieving their goals”. Increasingly, communities are articulating their frustration and desperation through politicised public violence. Steyn (2015) indicates that, “In the 2009 to 2013 period, the Incident Registration Information System (IRIS) database claims that of all crowd incidences, 10.8% or 4493 of these were protest actions attributed to local service delivery”

Respondent: that people just don’t understand protocol and the policies of local government in terms of how service delivery actually happens and I think what you saying is if you have somebody there to communicate that. (Focus group participant, ward committee member). Respondent: ja, because they want service delivery at a certain area….houses and services delivery will be speed humps. (Councillor). Respondent 1: I’m thinking maybe I want to share some of the experience that I have experienced lately with the current Councillors. I don’t know how they stand up in Community AB currently with the climate of expectations from communities to be delivered or services delivered by your doorway. And I think it was rarely it was a rarely experienced to understand how they also just doing a job
These findings reinforce previous SALGA studies.

a. Politically Motivated Violence

The idea of politics as a motivation for the violence surfaced in several of the interviews. Participants spoke about political motivations for appointments or as a competition for resources. They emphasised the importance of election time as a specifically dangerous period for Councillors.

Respondent: then they set up a ... I must now recall back they set up a steering committee but the steering committee for various reasons the ward councillor was playing politics and so there was the allegation against him that he was choosing people from political pin pit political side (Senior municipal manager). Respondent: But in terms of the root causes its always political... it’s political contestation ... and sometimes within intra-party political contestation...and it’s a competition for resources (Senior municipal manager). Respondent: Politics yes...Because this attacks mostly started after I became a councillor. (councillor). Respondent: and when its election time it is worse...and that is the time the political parties don't look after their public servants...and that is the time they should, there should be security for the public servants...and increased safety measures in place. (councillor). ...it was a difficult time as you know I was with the ANC for many years almost 30 years I was ANC...they will park next door now the dogs ran out because I have 5 dogs and I mean real dogs...they drove over my door in front over my dog in front of me. How cruel, but...they had ANC sweaters on.

The findings indicate that sometimes, politically motivated violence arises out of intra-party politics as well and not only inter-party politics.

8.6 Psychological and Emotional Effects of the Violence

Participants described how they felt and how they dealt with being targets of direct or threatening violence and harm. They felt unsafe, vulnerable and experienced a sense of shock and uncertainty.

a. Feeling Unsafe and Vulnerable

Respondent: ...you know what I can't do, I'm not driving alone...my daughters drive me...I can't travel the same road back and forth. (Councillor). Respondent: I don't wear the party’s logo...sweaters...ja it’s too a risk [yes].(Councillor). Respondent: So you not safe yet that feeling of unsafeness is always there. (Councillor). Respondent: and when its election time it get its worse...and that is the time the political parties don’t look after their public servants...and that is the time when they should have security for the public servants...and increased safety measures in place. (Councillor). Respondent: anybody can drive in here and look what is a councillor or look on the city’s website that is the councillor’s address and come there you won’t know...so you are more exposed to danger. (Councillor)
One’s sense of vulnerability is compounded when one is a female local government official.

Ja there’s not a man in the house it’s only children and…their grandma and that…So you feel double…(Female Ward Councillor). As a local government official, it is not only you that is exposed to possible acts of damage to your property, threats, intimidation, and physical violence, but so are members of your family. …my other child screams because we thought my daughter that is still coming out of church and look here’s now shooting. …my daughter was sitting there and he attacked my daughter. (Female ward councillor).

b. Desensitisation

The damage to property, threats, intimidation, and physical attacks happened so frequently that it became normalised and the targeted victims were almost desensitised. The interviewee was also not sure whether all of these were politically motivated or whether sometimes mere criminal acts.

…now by that time I did get use to this sort of attacks I did lay almost 40 cases. I can’t tell you if it’s criminal or political. I said to the cops I don’t know if it’s political. (Ward Councillor)

c. A sense of Shock and Disbelief

The participants described their emotional and psychological reactions to their experiences of violence. They expressed a sense of shock and a feeling of vulnerability.

Respondent 1: the security was so shocked they stood shivering but I thought they did kill one of them and I was in a state. (Councillor). Respondent 1: now the next day you will look over your shoulder the whole time because you know you can’t trust security because they don’t perhaps understand you or they do their own thing. (Councillor)

8.7 Response by City: Contesting Care, Protection and Security

There were mixed responses to the knowledge and implementation of existing policy and protocol in relation to ensuring the safety of Municipal Officials and Councillors. Some Municipal Managers knew that the policy existed and argued that the system is well implemented. Conversely, the Councillors articulated a different experience. Councillors spoke to their personal experience of security provision and did not mention a policy or protocol.
a. Protocol/Policy, Security and Protection

Respondent: I know he [speaker] applies a policy but I can’t remember what the policy’s name is. (Senior municipal Manager). Respondent: there’s an exposure report. (Senior municipal manager). Respondent: for instance offering a security guard. (Senior municipal manager). Respondent: for the [unknown] he decide to protect by upgrading the security facilities. (Senior municipal manager). Respondent: put him [supply chain management director] on 2 weeks special leave to get him out of the city... and we even sent him on holiday. In fact, we only gave him leave with the commitment that he is leaving the county for 2 weeks... (Senior Municipal Manager). Respondent: to put panic buttons in his house, beefed up his security, etc. (Senior municipal Manager). Respondent: okay so I mean that’s the main is when officials have experienced the threats then the city moves towards a protection service or contracts out a security at home and or whatever. (Senior municipal manager). Respondent: No the city did give me security... I had security for 2 years, 2 or 3 years. I stopped the security myself... because there was a language barrier... and sometimes they were shooting at the security. (Councillor). Respondent: a footage on these three guys. How they came out of their car...and how they...no arrest... no intervention, no form of protection. (Councillor). Respondent: and they all be start becoming friends they said but I know Councillor to Councillor why do you want to. So I’ve got a panic button it’s not working. (Focus group participant, ward committee member). Respondent: this area people did get me advice throw a lot of broken bottles...because then their blood will lay there (Councillor)

In the last excerpt, the respondent also described the advice she received for getting the necessary evidence if she filed a police charge against a potential perpetrator.

b. Involvement of the Police:

Participants shared their experiences of laying criminal charges and alerting the police to the incidents of violence against them. There was a consensus that the police should be notified and a formal charge should be laid, yet there was no evidence of actual police involvement. A councillor spoke about deliberate avoidance by the police to act on the reports of violence and threats.

Respondent: one of the things is definitely an independent report from the police. (Senior municipal Manager). Respondent: typically what happens is either then asks for the police to get involved. (Senior municipal Manager). Respondent: so I mean even I had to involve the police... the city wouldn’t protect me, initially at that stage...cause they didn’t want to see themselves aligning with me. (Senior municipal manager). Respondent: So that’s how severe it is we don’t know up to this day who did it, the police came... no case was laid, nothing happened...no investigation...Metro police came, no investigation. (Councillor)

As indicated earlier, the police mostly actively refused to assist Ward Councillors and Municipal Managers.

c. Counselling

There were mixed responses on the provision of counselling services. The administrators believed that there was a counselling service available and perhaps it was just not requested. On the other hand Councillors did not know of the counselling service and requested that debriefing services be made available to them.
Respondent: we offered counselling [this is when a politician experiences acts of violence]. (Senior municipal manager). Respondent: neh and just last week on Friday I said to somebody you know what they should have, medical counsellors...or counsellors so they can download. (Councillor). Respondent: and there should be counselling for Councillors...there should be counselling.... professional counselling for Councillors. (Councillor). Respondent: debriefing, what do you call it... nothing is happening for us...We must cope, we must try to cope. The only debriefing session I have is up here that make me strong. That’s why I’m that type of person, I am not scared for anyone in life. I am only scared for my God, because my God guides me and I, and I I said to myself God I’m a human being, I can make mistakes. But the public out here or wherever, they want the Councillor not to make mistakes. (Councillor)

Her emphasis on the importance of psychosocial support also appeared to be tied to her observation that, some Ward Councillors were young and innocent, and not attuned to the cruel realities of the world, and the implication this has for local government officials in particular.

I’m looking last night also... I look at these young Councillors... And you can see they still untouched... And I was just thinking yoh if they just know how cruel this world can be. While there was provision for ensuring the physical security of the Ward Councillors and Municipal Managers, there was no service provision for ‘coping’ and dealing with the emotional trauma experienced by Councillors. Senior Municipal Managers believed that if requested they would be granted counselling services.

d. Principles of Care and Protection

There were mixed responses to the City and political parties providing care and protection of Ward Councillors and Municipal Managers. The administrators felt that there was care provided, but Councillors felt that political parties did not demonstrate or extend enough care for Councillors.

Respondent: There is a certain sense of care that he [speaker] has. (Senior municipal manager). Respondent: there is definitely a caring space within the city. (Senior municipal manager). Respondent: and we even sent him [supply chain management director] on holiday. In fact we only gave him leave with the commitment that he is leaving the county for 2 weeks...2 weeks exit, etc., for Councillors same, but it would be through the speaker’s office. (Senior municipal manager). Respondent: but in answer to it I mean I don’t know what more, how much more I could do than say the only way Ward Councillors can really... a lot of it they need to take it responsibility for themselves and ensure that they continually care. (Senior municipal Manager). Respondent: that’s why I feel nobody cares about Councillors not even...the parties. (Councillor). Respondent: no I can tell you when I look at all the other Councillors that have been murdered in the other provinces...it gets to me...because I feel the parties are not taking really care. (Councillor)

8.8 Discussion and Findings

Violence across the local government system is widespread. Cilliers and Aucoin (2016) state that, “While all violence is technically social as it is carried out in and by society, political aspirations and motivation are what makes violence political or public – i.e. violent protests against local government and political assassinations and xenophobic attacks”.

Violence in Local Government: A Study on Damage to Property, Intimidation, Threats, Harm, and Killing of Councillors and Municipal Officials
The findings indicate that politicised violence in the City of Cape Town Metro includes both direct and threats of violence directed at Ward Councillors and Municipal Managers, damage to their homes and cars; and direct and threats of harm to their families. Similarly, violence was directed at administrative officials working within local government. This finding resonates with the previous research commissioned by SALGA (Violence and Democracy, 2016) but gives a descriptive and personal account of its effects on Ward Councillors and Senior Municipal Managers.

The reasons for the use of violence seem to be two-fold; on the one hand, violence is increasingly because of perceptions of lack of service delivery, and on the other hand, violence seems politically motivated. In the first instance, violence is mobilised through a collective crowd and is indiscriminate, and in the second instance, violence is directed at a specific individual who is perceived as responsible and to be held accountable.

Ward Councillors interface directly with the communities, where they tend to be blamed for service delivery and other issues and to bear the brunt of the anger and frustration of local communities. It was also not always clear whether the motivation for violence, threats and intimidation was political, or whether it was merely aggrieved community members acting out of frustration and anger because of poor service delivery.

Councillors believed that one of the key reasons for frustration and anger about service delivery centres on the existence of unrealistic expectations by communities. There is seemingly a lack of understanding on the part of the communities, about service delivery-related processes and procedures, which need to be followed at local government level. Communities are seemingly also angered by the appointment of incompetent officials to government positions and the resultant severe impact on service delivery.

Ward Councillors also described the effect of the violence on their families. The responsibility to responding to the violence is located within the city but is focused on securitisation and the use of panic buttons or security officers. There is a need for an approach that includes debriefing sessions, particularly for Ward Councillors based within communities, after incidents of violence.

The findings indicate that there are several options for determining a way forward. Previous research (Madumo, 2015) indicates that there should be a clear role, “between politicians and administrators, and their role and functioning should be clearly demarcated so that each one does not act in ultra-vires when delivering services in line with the Municipal Structures Act of 1998”. On the other hand, one of the respondents suggested:

Respondent: I think if you get rid of the financial incentives for politicians...you will go I think you’ll go a long way to... in fact I’m convinced, to actually eradicating this violence and threats and intimidation.

Yet, Councillors identified that immediate support in the form of counselling and debriefing should be provided. It is also evident that a more concerted effort by the police to act on charges and complaints of violence and acts of intimidation must be ensured.
9. CONCLUSION
9. CONCLUSION

The study on Violence in Local Government a Study on Damage to Property, Intimidation, Threats, Harm, and Killing of Councillors and Municipal Officials consisted of four components. These were (i) the creation and analysis of a historical database for the period 2000 to 2018; (ii) an analysis of SASRIA data on incidents of municipal property destruction and loss; (iii) case studies in Richmond and the City of Cape Town (Atlantis) respectively; and (iv) a survey of the experiences of violence among the mentioned categories of local government officials and politicians.

The study found that local government Councillors frequently experience violence and threats. This is revealed by both the survey findings and the case studies in Richmond and Atlantis, which indicate that political violence is mostly directed towards Ward Councillors in the municipality. Similarly, an analysis of the historical database for the period 2000 to 2018 showed that 89 Councillors were assassinated during this period while a number of attempted assassinations were also recorded. KwaZulu-Natal stands out as the province where Councillors are particularly under siege due to political violence with the highest number of Councillors assassinated while Ethekwini Metropolitan Municipality is the area worst affected by political violence with the highest number of assassinations and attempted assassinations.

Results from both the historical database and the Richmond and Atlantis case studies indicated that Municipal Managers and Senior Municipal Officials are also at risk of political violence, although to a lesser extent than Councillors are. Similarly, ward committee members are sometimes also victims of political violence.

More than half of the survey respondents who reported harm or violence indicated that it had been directed at them personally. This finding is mirrored in the case studies and in the historical database.

The empirical study conducted in the Richmond municipal area revealed that threats, including death threats, are commonly used to influence, intimidate and scare Ward Councillors and senior municipal management. Likewise, the survey results showed that the most frequent harm to which respondents reported having been exposed was a threat, while smaller numbers have experienced physical harm and damage to property. The Atlantis case study noted that threats of harm directed at both Councillors and senior municipal management were reported more often than direct attacks. In addition, study participants also experienced damage to their homes and cars.

Many of the Richmond respondents did not know the identities of the perpetrators of violent acts against them, especially since third parties were often used to carry out these violent acts. The survey results, however, revealed that the main sources of violence or threats were from community members and members of political parties and that more than half of the respondents knew the perpetrators. The Atlantis case study suggests that, amongst others, community members may be the perpetrators, although it is sometimes unclear whether the acts of violence are not mere criminal acts. Results from both the survey and the Richmond case study showed that slightly more respondents indicated that there had been no early warnings or signs of possible violence beforehand, than those who said there had been prior warnings.
Survey respondents believed that frustration about a lack of municipal service delivery was the main motive for threats and violence, although general criminality and municipal elections also played a role. Similarly, respondents in both Richmond and the City of Cape Town highlighted lack of service delivery as an important motive for violence. In addition, respondents in Richmond believed that the intra-party contestation for power was an important reason for violence, as were practices around the tendering system to secure services, infrastructure and goods. Unemployment and the lack of job opportunities in Richmond may also motivate prospective ward council candidates to resort to violence. The Atlantis case study notes that the reasons for the use of violence seem to be two-fold. On the one hand, violence is increasingly because of perceptions of lack of service delivery, and on the other hand, violence seems to be politically motivated. In the first instance, violence is mobilised through a collective crowd and is indiscriminate, and in the second instance, violence is directed at a specific individual who is perceived as responsible and to be held accountable. A finding from the historical database pertains to a high correlation between peaks in political assassinations, attempted assassinations and years when local government elections takes place. The year that follows municipal elections is also particularly violent.

Almost half of the survey respondents indicated that nothing was done after they had reported the incidents to the police and or the municipal council. However, some did receive assistance such as counselling, legal protection, replacement or rebuilding of property hospitalisation or financial compensation. A substantial number of respondents were not offered any remedial action to deal with their loss or trauma. Unsurprisingly half of respondents felt that the remedial actions they were offered were not satisfactory. The Richmond case study revealed similar sentiments on this issue. Participants in the Atlantis case study indicated that although formal charges of acts of violence are laid at the police, they believed that the police mostly do not act on these charges. While there was provision for ensuring the physical security of the Ward Councillors and municipal management in the City of Cape Town, Councillors reported that there was no service provision for ‘coping’ and dealing with the emotional trauma experienced by them. However, municipal management believed that counselling services were indeed available and would be provided upon request.

Respondents from both the survey and the two case studies were of the view that violence and threats prevent politicians and Municipal Officials from effectively carrying out their duties owing to the resultant impact on their freedom of movement, among others. In addition high numbers of respondents indicated, that they feel unsafe while doing their local government jobs, including travelling in their municipal areas to visit communities or municipal sites. More than two-thirds of the survey respondents felt that ‘Violence and threats prevent Councillors from running for office again’. The Richmond case study revealed that some Senior Municipal Officials resigned because of acts of violence in the municipality, which has resulted in a lack of capacity and delays in service delivery.

Respondents from the case studies as well as more than half of the survey respondents felt vulnerable and are not satisfied with the existing safety mechanisms in their respective municipalities. In search of remedies, it was suggested that their councils need to improve security measures at the municipal premises or at their homes. Municipal management in the City of Cape Town alluded to an existing safety and security protocol in the Metro, which is well implemented. The protocol is focused on securitisation and on the use of security officers and panic buttons.
An analysis from the SASRIA database revealed that for the period 2014 to 2018, the value of political riot-related claims consistently reduced from year to year and comprised 16% of total claims. During the period, 2013 to 2018 there was a general increase in non-political claims while the value of strike-related claims reduced for the period 2013 to 2018. However, 2017 marked a significant exception to the general trend of lower strike related claims. The total damage pay out for all types of political related incidents for the period 2013-2018 was valued at R61 million (rounded). Of this amount, service delivery (political) related incidents were by far the most expensive and contributed to R57 million of damage payouts. Other political related incidents were less significant but included damage due to political elections (R3.8 million), riots with a political objective (R361 000), political celebrations (R 29 000) and targeting of office bearers (R157 000). In total the damage pay out for all types of incidents was valued at R392 million for the period under review.

The study thus indicates that exposure to threats and violence is a common experience among local government officials and Councillors and has increased over time, most disturbingly with a high number of assassinations of Ward Councillors. In the short-term, it is essential that municipalities exercise more effective and more compassionate care with officials who have experienced trauma of this nature. Failure to implement appropriate security procedures, reporting methods and remedial mechanisms will have devastating effects on the human resources capacity of municipalities and thus further compound their ongoing struggle to deliver effective services to citizens. In the longer term, the goal should be efficient and smooth-operating municipalities free from political violence. This will ultimately reduce the motives and opportunities for the perpetration of violence or threats against honest and committed local government Councillors, managers, officials and ward committee members. In the main, the study calls for urgent interventions against political violence and the threats to political careers.
10. RECOMMENDATIONS
10. RECOMMENDATIONS

Failure to introduce and implement appropriate preventive measures will have devastating effects on the morale of Councillors and Municipal Officials and will severely compromise their ability to manage and implement effective service delivery. The study calls for urgent interventions to address political violence and an end to the threat upon the lives and careers of politicians and officials.

To this end, political killings are a threat to democracy as was pointed out by the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) in the build up towards the 2016 local government, where they noted that politically motivated murders and other acts of intimidation are endangering citizen’s constitutional rights (Khoisan, 2016). This results in the inability of local government to attract suitable, qualified people for employment. SALGA needs to investigate ways to mitigate this phenomenon in the interest of good governance informed the following 15 solid recommendations:

• It is crucial that key recommendations from the Moerane Commission of Inquiry, which focused on KwaZulu-Natal province, should be escalated and applied nationally. According to Moerane Commission (2018:417):

  i. Political parties must take responsibility for the violent competition between their members for political positions and power (Moerane Commission, 2018:417).

  ii. Political parties should urgently educate their members about democratic practices, especially the universal practice of peaceful political competition as opposed to political intolerance and violent political competition (Moerane Commission, 2018:417).

  iii. The State immediately take measures to depoliticise and professionalise the public service. This is in line also with the National Development Plan, Chapter 13 on local government, which also calls for the professionalisation of the public service to prevent the politics of patronage, incumbency and personal accumulation.

• There should be a clearer dichotomy of roles and functions between politicians and administrators so that they do not encroach and overlap each other when delivering services. The distinct roles and functions must then be put into practice in line with the Municipal Structures Act, Act 117 of 1998 without any further delays.

• Political party contestations, factions and factionalism need to be better managed and put under control by political parties, as a means of reducing intra-party violence, intimidation and killings. This is also highlighted in the Moerane Commission of Inquiry. Based on this recommendation, the current party-system must be put on critical scrutiny and review against alternative options on the cards as a long-term measure.

• Councillors need to be aptly supported by SALGA to pursue their studies and further qualifications as a means of increasing their chances of being employed after the expiry of their terms of office. This will reduce the problem of many Councillors who perceive their call of duty as political career opportunism or political ‘careerists’. Gradually, this could reduce the motive for political rivalry and killings over a longer span of time.
• Since the current tendering system in local government was highlighted in the study as one of the main causes of political violence in local municipalities, it needs to be scrutinised and reviewed to determine if the tendering system can be altered in such a way as to eliminate supply chain corruption.

• As frustration about a perceived lack of municipal service delivery was identified by study participants as an important motive for violence, political or civic, SALGA should regularly encourage municipalities to audit the level of service delivery in the respective municipalities in order to address burning issues as far as possible as an early warning intervention and precaution to potential violence.

• Based on the fact that security measures at council’s premises and the homes of Councillors (as targeted danger zones) are deemed inadequate, it is therefore absolutely necessary that security measures be improved by first conducting proactive security assessments to inform increased budget and alternative innovative security interventions in order to enhance the adequacy of current protection services.

• Support to persons and families affected by political violence, whether emotionally or psychologically, should be made compulsory in the municipalities immediately after a threat or an incident of violence. The support should take the form of debriefing and intensive counselling as therapeutic intervention mechanisms in place.

• There is a need to create synergies between SALGA and the SAPS, through the safety and security cluster and the portfolio committee as an oversight body, to ensure that there is a more and direct concerted effort by the police to act on charges and complaints of violence and acts of intimidation. The culprits must not only be prosecuted but should be publicised to send a good signal to the society to see that justice has been served without fail.

• In the main, SALGA must engage with the National Prosecution Authority to establish the number of offenders that were prosecuted and jailed for assassination of Councillors. This would indicate the extent and veracity of consequences for the killing of Councillors.

• Due to current SASRIA insurance, which only covers mayors and Councillors against the loss of their property caused by civil commotion, public disorder, strikes, riots and terrorism it is strongly recommended that SASRIA cover should be extended to also include Senior Municipal Officials in their various capacities in the sphere of local government.

• There is a lack of understanding on the part of the communities of processes and procedures, which need to be followed at local government level to facilitate service delivery. The hosting of campaigns to educate communities on these processes and procedures may assist to lessen anger and frustration as well as create a better understanding for the recognition of the important responsibilities and work of politicians and Municipal Officials.

• As such, constructive citizen engagement must be prioritised. Meaningful engagement (not as once off or intermittent activity) should accordingly be facilitated between Ward Councillors, ward committee members and community members to enhance effective participatory and developmental local governance in order to reclaim trust in local government and its leaders.

• This research only provides a ‘tip of the iceberg’, and it is recommended that a larger research project be implemented to further assess the nature and incidence of violence and intimidation to Ward Councillors and municipal management through ethnographic lenses. This should also be looked at from a socio-economic context of the prevailing poverty and inequalities in the country. The comprehensive study should also involve political parties as key informants.

REFERENCES


Violence in Local Government: A Study on Damage to Property, Intimidation, Threats, Harm, and Killing of Councillors and Municipal Officials


Siddle, A. & Koelbe, T. 2015. *Local government in South Africa: Can the objectives of the developmental state be achieved through the current model of decentralised governance?*


ANNEXURE 1 IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW DISCUSSION
SCHEDULE: POLITICIANS

The HSRC on behalf of SALGA is currently conducting a survey on the experiences of violence endured by Councillors and Ward Committee Members and during their terms of office. Over the past decades, evidence has emerged that Councillors and Ward Committee Members have been either threatened or harmed because of various incidents that happened in their municipalities. In this context, harm is defined as violent contact or threats against a Councillor and Ward Committee Member. For the purposes of this study, a violent contact is any form of unwelcome physical conduct that causes physical pain, harm or injury to a person or damage to their property. A threat is any form of speech that indicates a willingness made by a person against a Councillor and Ward Committee Member to perform an act that causes physical pain, injury or damage to their property. Anonymity of the participants will be maintained. The duration of your participation if you choose to enroll and remain in the study is expected to be between 30–45 minutes of the interview.

Interview Schedule

• What are the main reasons behind political killings?
• Why do such reasons lead to political killing?
• What is the relationship between resources, political power and political killings?
• To whom is political violence mostly directed to, and why?
• Have you ever been threatened/intimidated?
• Have your family ever been threatened/intimidated?
• Have you ever been affected by instances of harm to your person or the destruction of your property?
• If you have been affected by political violence, did you receive any early warning of what was about to happen?
• If you have been affected by political violence, how did you deal with the effects thereof? (For example, received counselling, report to police, hospitalized, obtained legal protection, receive financial compensation, rebuilt or replace property.)
• Were you familiar with identity of the perpetrators of violence against you or your family?
• Does political violence affect your ability to carry out your duties?
• What are the main reasons behind the killings of Senior Municipal Officials?
• Does political violence affect municipal efficiency?
• What actions have been taken to protect Councillors and Senior Municipal Officials from political killings?
• Do you believe that actions to protect Councillors and Senior Municipal Officials are sufficient?
• How often do political killings occur in your municipal demarcation?
• Are political killings associated to inter/intra party politics?

THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION
The HSRC on behalf of SALGA is currently conducting a survey on the experiences of violence endured by Senior Municipal Officials during their terms of office. Over the past decades, evidence has emerged that Senior Municipal Officials have been either threatened or harmed because of various incidents that happened in their municipalities. In this context, harm is defined as violent contact or threats against a Senior Municipal Official. For the purposes of this study, a violent contact is any form of unwelcome physical conduct that causes physical pain, harm or injury to a person or damage to their property. A threat is any form of speech that indicates a willingness made by a person against a Senior Municipal Official to perform an act that causes physical pain, injury or damage to their property. Anonymity of the participants will be maintained. The duration of your participation, if you choose to participate and remain in the study, is expected to be about 60 minutes.

Interview Schedule

• What are the main reasons behind acts of violence against Senior Municipal Officials in your municipality? Please explain your answer.

• To whom is acts of violence mostly directed to in your municipality, and why?

• In your opinion, is there a relationship between resources, power, and the killings of Senior Municipal Officials? Please explain.

• Have you ever been threatened/intimidated due to your position as senior municipal employee? If yes, please provide information on these acts of violence against you.

• Have your family ever been threatened/intimidated due to your position as senior municipal employee? If yes, please provide information.

• Have you ever been affected by instances of harm to your person or the destruction of your property due to your position as senior municipal employee? If yes, please provide information on these incidents.

• If any form of violence has affected you, how often did these acts of violence occur?

• If you have been affected by any form of violence, did you receive any early warning of what was about to happen? Please explain.

• Were you familiar with the identity of the perpetrators of violence against you or your family? Please provide information.

• If you have been affected by acts of violence, how did you deal with the effects thereof? (For example, received counselling, report to police, hospitalized, obtained legal protection, receive financial compensation, rebuilt or replace property.)

• If you or your family have been affected by acts of violence, what have the impact been on you? (For example, ability to carry out your duties as senior municipal official, thoughts of resigning as municipal official, and feelings of unsafety at work and home).

• In your opinion, does acts of violence against Senior Municipal Officials affect municipal efficiency?

• What actions have been taken in your municipality to protect Senior Municipal Officials from act of violence? Please explain.

• Do you believe that actions to protect Senior Municipal Officials are sufficient? Please explain your answer.

• Is there anything that you like to add to our conversation?

THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION
ANNEXURE 3  MULTI-STAKEHOLDER FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION SCHEDULE

Introduction

Hello, my name is ................................. I am working for the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). The HSRC is a national research organisation with offices in Pretoria, Cape Town, Durban, PE and Sweetwaters.

The HSRC on behalf of SALGA is conducting research on the experiences of violence endured by Municipal Managers, Ward Councillors and Members of Ward Committees during their terms of office. Over the past decades evidence has emerged that Councillors and Ward Committee Members have been either been threatened or harmed as a result of various incidents that happened in their municipalities. In this context, harm is defined as violent contact or threats against a Municipal Manager, Ward Councillor or Member of a Ward Committee. For the purposes of this study, a violent contact is any form of unwelcome physical conduct that causes physical pain, harm or injury to a person or damage to their property. A threat is any form of speech that indicates a willingness made by a person to perform an act that causes physical pain, injury or damage to their property. Anonymity of the participants will be maintained. The duration of the focus group interview if you choose to participate is expected to be approximately 90 minutes.

Questions:

• What do most people think are generally the reasons for why local government officials become targets of political killings?
• What do most people think about the possibility that the killings of government officials may be preceded by threats, acts of intimidation, or physical attacks? If so, please explain.
• Have most people heard of any local government official in this community that has ever been threatened because of local government politics?
• If so, please explain.
• Have most people heard if any support or counselling was provided in this case/s? Please explain
• Have most people heard of any cases where families of local government officials have been physically attacked?
• If so, please provide more information?
• Do many people know if any support or counselling was provided in this case/s? Please explain
• Have most people heard of any cases where the property of local government officials has been damaged because of their work in local government? Please explain
• Do most people know of anyone who has been killed because of his or her work as a local government official?
• If so, what do most people think was the specific reason why the official was targeted?
• How should local government respond to the trauma invoked by the threats and harm directed at local government Councillors/officials?
• How can local government improve their trauma counselling support and services to victims and family members of victims of this political violence?

THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION
ANNEXURE 4  THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

Experiences of Harm or Threats of Violence
Councillors, Ward Committee Members, Municipal Managers and Senior Officials

The HSRC on behalf of SALGA is conducting a survey on experiences of violence by Councillors, Ward Committee Members and Municipal Officials. Over the past decades, evidence has emerged that many have been either threatened or harmed because of incidents in their municipalities. (For this study, harm is defined as violent contact or threats against an official, in any form of unwelcome physical conduct that causes physical pain, harm or injury to a person, or damage to their property. A threat is any form of speech against an official that indicates a willingness to perform an act that causes physical pain, injury or damage to their property). This questionnaire is anonymous and no personal details are recorded in this survey. The questionnaire should take 10-20 to complete.

Please select the appropriate answer that is closest to your own experience. If you select the option marked ‘other’, please be sure to explain or describe what you mean by selecting other.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do you voluntarily agree to participate in this survey?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Please indicate your position within your municipality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillor (Ward or PR)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward Committee Member</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Manager</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Municipal Official</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TYPES OF VIOLENCE**

As a Councillor or Municipal Official or Ward Committee Member, have you been exposed to any sort of threat or violence?

If yes, what type of violence?

- Threat
- Physical harm
- Damage to property (e.g. your car, home)
- Other, specify

Were there any early warnings or signs of possible violence before it happened?

Was the violence directed towards?

- You personally
- Your family
- Your extended family
- Your property

How often or frequent was the violence experienced?

- Once
- Twice
- Several times
- Other, specify

Please indicate the source(s) of the threats you have experienced

- Community members
- Members of political parties
- Members of trade unions
- Businessmen
- All of these
- Other, specify
Do you know the perpetrators? Yes [ ] No [ ]

What do you think were the motivations of the instigators or perpetrators?
- Service delivery
- Municipal elections
- Public safety
- General criminality
- Other, specify …………

How did you deal with the violence experienced?
- Reported to Council
- Reported to the Police
- Obtained private security
- Couldn’t deal with the issues

Are you aware of violence or threats made to fellow workers? Yes [ ] No [ ]

How often were threats of violence made against fellow workers that you are aware of during the past 2 years?
- Once
- Twice
- Several times

REMEDIAL ACTIONS

What were the outcomes after you reported or took action in response to the threats?
- Violence stopped
- More violence occurred
- Perpetrators were arrested
- Nothing happened
- Other, specify …………

How easy or difficult was it to obtain formal assistance for dealing with your loss or trauma?
- Very Easy
- Easy
- Neither easy nor difficult
- Difficult
- Very Difficult

What type of remedial actions were you offered to deal with your loss or trauma?
- Counselling
- Hospitalisation
- Legal protection
- Financial compensation
- Property rebuilt or replace
- Other, specify

Do you feel that the remedial actions offered to you were adequate and to your satisfaction? Yes [ ] No [ ]

EFFECTS OF VIOLENCE

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

Violence and threats prevent Councillors/ Ward Committee Members/ Officials from effectively carrying out their duties.
- Strongly Agree
- Agree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly Disagree

Violence and threats prevent Councillors from running for office again.
- Strongly Agree
- Agree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly Disagree

Violence and threats impact negatively on my family.
- Strongly Agree
- Agree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly Disagree
How safe do you feel when you are doing your job as a Councillor/ Ward Committee Member/ Official/ Municipal Manager?

Very Safe ☐ Safe ☐ Unsafe ☐ Very Unsafe ☐

Do you feel protected by your Municipal Council? Yes ☐ No ☐

Are you satisfied with the existing safety mechanisms in your municipality? Yes ☐ No ☐

What do you think can be done to improve the safety of Councillors/ Ward Committee Members/ Municipal Officials?

If there is anything you would like to add, please do so. This may be related to your experiences of threats or violence, whether against yourself or witnessed against fellow public representatives.

PROTEST ACTION

When was the last protest in your municipality? Month ☐ Year ☐

Was the municipality notified of the protest action in accordance with the Regulation of Public Gatherings Act? Yes ☐ No ☐ Unsure ☐

Approximately how many people were in the protest?

What was the issue stated as the cause of the protest?

DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

Gender Female ☐ Male ☐

Age Group 20-30 ☐ 31-40 ☐ 41-50 ☐ 51-60 ☐ 61 or above ☐

Provincial location of Municipality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eastern Cape</th>
<th>Free State</th>
<th>Gauteng</th>
<th>KwaZulu-Natal</th>
<th>Limpopo</th>
<th>Mpumalanga</th>
<th>Northern Cape</th>
<th>North-West</th>
<th>Western Cape</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Type of Municipality Metro ☐ District ☐ Local ☐

How many years have you served as a Councillor/ Municipal Official/ Municipal Manager/ Ward Committee Member?

Less than 6 years ☐ 6-10 years ☐ 11-20 years ☐ 21 years or more ☐
ANNEXURE 5 POLITICIANS/POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES (INFORMATION SHEET AND CONSENT FORM)

VIOLENCE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT A STUDY ON DAMAGE TO PROPERTY, INTIMIDATION, THREATS, HARM, AND KILLING OF COUNCILLORS AND Municipal Officials

Who we are
Hello, my name is ............................................. I am working for the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). The HSRC is a national research organisation with offices in Pretoria, Cape Town, Durban, PE and Sweetwaters.

What we are doing
We are conducting a study on behalf of the South African Local Government Association (SALGA) into damage to property, intimidation, threats, harm and killings of councilors, Senior Municipal Officials, Municipal Managers and Members of Ward Committees. The aim of the research is to develop a national database constituted from country-wide documented cases of the killing, harm, intimidation and property loss of local government officials and Municipal Managers for the period 2000 to 2018. As part of the study we deemed it important to interview politicians/political representatives in affected areas.

Your participation
We are asking for permission to interview you about the damage to property, intimidation, threats, harm and killings of councilors, Senior Municipal Officials, Municipal Managers and Members of Ward Committees in your area. You are receiving the invitation to participate in this project because we believe that your perspectives and experiences are important to the study’s aim and objectives. If you agree, we will ask you to participate in an interview for approximately an hour.

Please understand that your participation is voluntary and you are not being forced to take part in this study. The choice of whether to participate or not, is yours alone. If you choose not to take part, you will not be affected in any way whatsoever. If you agree to participate, you may stop me at any time if you feel that you do not want to continue. Doing so will not result in penalties and you will not be prejudiced in any way.

Confidentiality
The HSRC takes all reasonable efforts to ensure confidentiality of all personal information obtained during its research processes. With your permission, we would like to record the interview electronically to ensure that we accurately reflect what is said. Unless you give us specific permission to do so, we will not record your name anywhere, which will make it impossible for anyone outside the HSRC to connect you to the answers you give. If you agree that your answers may be recorded, the recording will be anonymised, i.e. linked to a fictitious name.
or code number and we will refer to you in this way in the data, any publication, report or other research output. Your name and the name of your organisation will also not be attached to the transcript of the recording. All identifying information will be kept in a locked office or stored electronically on computers under the authority of the principal investigator. No one will be able to link you to the answers you give. Your answers will be stored electronically in a secure environment and used for research or academic purposes now or later in ways that will not reveal who you are.

Risks/discomforts

At the present time, we foresee that there may be emotional and/or social harm from your participation due to memory of incidents of violence. Should you experience any trauma by participating in this study, you may contact the following service provider who will offer confidential counselling services: Careways; telephone number: +27 11 219 9000

Benefits

There are no immediate benefits to you from participating in this study. However, we hope it will promote understanding of the threats, harms and killings of councillors, Senior Municipal Officials, Municipal Managers and Members of Ward Committees in the local government sector. If you would like to receive feedback on our study, we will record your phone number on a separate sheet of paper and can send you the results of the study when it is completed sometime after April 2019.

Who to contact if you have been harmed or have any concerns

The HSRC Research Ethics Committee (REC) has approved this research. If you have any complaints about ethical aspects of the research or feel that you have been harmed in any way by participating in this study, please call the HSRC’s toll-free ethics hotline 0800 212 123 (when phoned from a landline from within South Africa) or contact the Human Sciences Research Council REC Administrator, on Tel 012 302 2012 or e-mail research.ethics@hsrc.ac.za. If you have concerns or questions about the research you may call the project leader Prof Modimowabarwa Kanyane, office number: 012-302 2809, mobile number 082 324 1338 and email address, bkanyane@hsrc.ac.za

Consent

I hereby agree to participate in research that explores views related to the damage to property, intimidation, threats, harm and killings of Councillors, Senior Municipal Officials, Municipal Managers and Members of Ward Committees. I understand that I am participating freely and without being forced in any way to do so. I also understand that I can stop participating at any point should I not want to continue and that this decision will not in any way affect me negatively. I understand that this is a research project whose purpose is not necessarily to benefit me personally in the immediate or short term. I understand that my participation will remain confidential.
CONSENT FOR TAPE RECORDING

I hereby agree to the tape-recording of my participation in the study.

Signature of participant Date:............................

I understand that the information that I provide will be stored electronically and will be used for research purposes now or at a later stage.

Signature of participant Date:............................

Thank you for your participation
ANNEXURE 6  SENIOR MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS
(INFORMATION SHEET AND CONSENT FORM)

VIOLENCE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT A STUDY ON DAMAGE TO PROPERTY, INTIMIDATION, THREATS, HARM, AND KILLING OF COUNCILLORS AND Municipal Officials

Who we are
Hello, my name is ……………………………… I am working for the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). The HSRC is a national research organisation with offices in Pretoria, Cape Town, Durban, PE and Sweetwaters.

What we are doing
We are conducting a study on behalf of the South African Local Government Association (SALGA) into damage to property, intimidation, threats, harm and killings of councilors, Senior Municipal Officials, Municipal Managers and Members of Ward Committees. The aim of the research is to develop a national database constituted from country-wide documented cases of the killing, harm, intimidation and property loss of local government officials and Municipal Managers for the period 2000 to 2018. As part of the study we deemed it important to interview Senior Municipal Officials in affected municipalities.

Your participation
We are asking for permission to interview you with regards to the damage to property, intimidation, threats, harm and killings of councilors, Senior Municipal Officials, Municipal Managers and Members of Ward Committees in your area. You are receiving the invitation to participate in this project because we believe that your perspectives and experiences are important to the study’s aim and objectives. If you agree, we will ask you to participate in an interview for approximately an hour.

Please understand that your participation is voluntary and you are not being forced to take part in this study. The choice of whether to participate or not, is yours alone. If you choose not to take part, you will not be affected in any way whatsoever. If you agree to participate, you may stop me at any time if you feel that you do not want to continue. Doing so will not result in penalties and you will not be prejudiced in any way.

Confidentiality
The HSRC takes all reasonable efforts to ensure confidentiality of all personal information obtained during its research processes. With your permission, we would like to record the interview electronically to ensure that we accurately reflect what is said. Unless you give us specific permission to do so, we will not record your name anywhere, which will make it impossible for anyone outside the HSRC to connect you to the answers you give. If you agree that your answers may be recorded, the recording will be anonymised, i.e. linked to a fictitious name or code number and we will refer to you in this way in the data, any publication, report or other research output. Your name and the name of your organisation will also not be attached to the transcript of the recording. All identifying information will be kept in a locked office or stored electronically on computers under the authority of the principal investigator. No one will be able to link you to the answers you give. Your answers will be stored electronically in a secure environment and used for research or academic purposes now or later in ways that will not reveal who you are.
Risks/discomforts

At the present time, we foresee that there may be emotional and/or social harm from your participation due to memory of incidents of violence. Should you experience any trauma by participating in this study, you may contact the following service provider who will offer confidential counselling services: Careways; telephone number: +27 11 219 9000.

Benefits

There are no immediate benefits to you from participating in this study. However, we hope it will promote understanding of the threats, harms and killings of councilors, Senior Municipal Officials, Municipal Managers and Members of Ward Committees in the local government sector. If you would like to receive feedback on our study, we will record your phone number on a separate sheet of paper and can send you the results of the study when it is completed sometime after April 2019.

Who to contact if you have been harmed or have any concerns

The HSRC Research Ethics Committee (REC) has approved this research. If you have any complaints about ethical aspects of the research or feel that you have been harmed in any way by participating in this study, please call the HSRC’s toll-free ethics hotline 0800 212 123 (when phoned from a landline from within South Africa) or contact the Human Sciences Research Council REC Administrator, on Tel 012 302 2012 or e-mail research.ethics@hsrc.ac.za. If you have concerns or questions about the research you may call the project leader Prof Modimowabarwa Kanyane, office number: 012-302 2809, mobile number 082 324 1338 and email address, bkanyane@hsrc.ac.za

Consent

I hereby agree to participate in research that explores views related to the damage to property, intimidation, threats, harm and killings of Councillors, Senior Municipal Officials, Municipal Managers and Members of Ward Committees. I understand that I am participating freely and without being forced in any way to do so. I also understand that I can stop participating at any point should I not want to continue and that this decision will not in any way affect me negatively. I understand that this is a research project whose purpose is not necessarily to benefit me personally in the immediate or short term. I understand that my participation will remain confidential.

……………………………..
Signature of participant Date:…………………..

CONSENT FOR TAPE RECORDING

I hereby agree to the tape-recording of my participation in the study.

……………………………..
Signature of participant Date:…………………..

I understand that the information that I provide will be stored electronically and will be used for research purposes now or at a later stage.

……………………………..
Signature of participant Date:…………………..

Thank you for your participation
ANNEXURE 7 MULTI-STAKEHOLDER FOCUS GROUPS (INFORMATION SHEET)

VIOLENCE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT A STUDY ON DAMAGE TO PROPERTY, INTIMIDATION, THREATS, HARM, AND KILLING OF COUNCILLORS AND Municipal Officials

Who we are

Hello, my name is .................. I am working for the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). The HSRC is a national research organisation with offices in Pretoria, Cape Town, Durban, PE and Sweetwaters.

What we are doing

We are conducting a study on behalf of the South African Local Government Association (SALGA) into damage to property, intimidation, threats, harm and killings of councilors, Senior Municipal Officials, Municipal Managers and Members of Ward Committees. The aim of the research is to develop a national database constituted from country-wide documented cases of the killing, harm, intimidation and property loss of local government officials and Municipal Managers for the period 2000 to 2018. As important stakeholders in the local government sector we would like to solicit your views on this issue. The stakeholders to be interviewed, through focus group discussions are the following people within your municipality: Councillors, Senior Municipal Officials, Municipal Managers and Members of Ward Committees in the area.

Your participation

We are asking for permission to interview you about the damage to property, intimidation, threats, harm and killings of councilors, Senior Municipal Officials, Municipal Managers and Members of Ward Committees. You are receiving the invitation to participate in this project because we believe that your experiences are important to the study’s aim and objectives. If you agree, we will ask you to participate in a focus group discussion for approximately ninety minutes.

Please understand that your participation is voluntary and you are not being forced to take part in this study. The choice of whether to participate or not, is yours alone. If you choose not to take part, you will not be affected in any way whatsoever. If you agree to participate, you may stop me at any time if you feel that you do not want to continue. Doing so will not result in penalties and you will not be prejudiced in any way.

Confidentiality

- The HSRC takes all reasonable efforts to ensure confidentiality of all personal information obtained during its research processes. The participants should be aware that although confidentiality will be encouraged in-group discussions it could not be guaranteed. It should be clear: 1) Although the research team will adhere to confidentiality and ensure anonymity of the data and reports, the team cannot guarantee that other participants will regard the information as confidential, but will be urged to do so, and 2) participants are thus advised not to disclose sensitive personal information in the focus group discussions.
• With your permission, we would like to record the interview electronically to ensure that we accurately reflect what is said. Unless you give us specific permission to do so, we will not record your name anywhere, which will make it impossible for anyone outside the HSRC to connect you to the answers you give. If you agree that your answers may be recorded, the recording will be anonymised, i.e. linked to a fictitious name or code number and we will refer to you in this way in the data, any publication, report or other research output. Your name and the name of your organisation will also not be attached to the transcript of the recording. All identifying information will be kept in a locked office or stored electronically on computers under the authority of the principal investigator. No one will be able to link you to the answers you give. Your answers will be stored electronically in a secure environment and used for research or academic purposes now or later in ways that will not reveal who you are.

Risks/discomforts

Now, we foresee that there may be emotional and / or social harm from your participation in the study due to memory of a threat or any form of violence against you. Should you experience any trauma by participating in this study, you may contact the following service provider who will offer confidential counselling services: Careways; telephone number: +27 11 219 9000.

Benefits

There are no immediate benefits to you from participating in this study. However, we hope it will promote understanding of the threats, harms and killings of Councillors, Senior Municipal Officials, Municipal Managers and Members of Ward Committees in the local government sector. If you would like to receive feedback on our study, we will record your phone number on a separate sheet of paper and can send you the results of the study when it is completed sometime after April 2019.

Who to contact if you have been harmed or have any concerns

The HSRC Research Ethics Committee (REC) has approved this research. If you have any complaints about ethical aspects of the research or feel that you have been harmed in any way by participating in this study, please call the HSRC’s toll-free ethics hotline 0800 212 123 (when phoned from a landline from within South Africa) or contact the Human Sciences Research Council REC Administrator, on Tel 012 302 2012 or e-mail research. ethics@hsrc.ac.za. If you have concerns or questions about the research, you may call the project leader Prof Modimowabarwa Kanyane, office number: 012-302 2809, mobile number 082 324 1338 and email address, bkanyane@hsrc.ac.za.

CONSENT

I hereby agree to participate in research that explores views related to the damage to property, intimidation, threats, harm and killings of Councillors, Senior Municipal Officials, Municipal Managers and Members of Ward Committees. I understand that I am participating freely and without being forced in any way to do so. I also understand that I can stop participating at any point should I not want to continue and that this decision will not in any way affect me negatively. I understand that this is a research project whose purpose is not necessarily to benefit me personally in the immediate or short term. I understand that my participation will remain confidential.
Participants should be aware that although confidentiality will be encouraged in-group discussions it cannot be guaranteed. It should be clear: 1) Although the research team will adhere to confidentiality and ensure anonymity of the data and reports, the team cannot guarantee that other participants will regard the information as confidential, but will be urged to do so, and 2) participants are thus advised not to disclose sensitive personal information.

Signature of participant Date:.........................

CONSENT FOR TAPE RECORDING

I hereby agree to the tape-recording of my participation in the study.

Signature of participant Date:.........................

I understand that the information that I provide will be stored electronically and will be used for research purposes now or at a later stage.

Signature of participant Date:.........................

THANK YOU
Contact Details:
Telephone: (012) 369 8000
Fax: (012) 369 8001
Physical Address:
Menlyn Corporate Park, Block B
175 Corobay Avenue
Cnr Garsfontein and Corobay
Waterkloof Glen ext 11
Pretoria

Social Media
Facebook: South African Local Government Association (SALGA)
Twitter: @SALGA_Gov
YouTube: SALGA TV
www.salga.org.za